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Abstract
The quality of management technology that is used to monitor and incentivize
workers varies substantially across countries. To understand the impact of this
on economic activities, I develop a two-sector model in which firms facing het-
erogeneous demands set up hierarchies to manage the production processes in a
monopolistically competitive sector. Entrepreneurs decide the number of hierar-
chical layers, the effort level of each worker, and the span of control of supervi-
sors. I then use the theory to explain two empirical findings established in the
literature. First, a common improvement in this type of management technology
across all firms intensifies competition in the monopolistically competitive sector.
As a result, the smallest firms are forced to leave the market; the most efficient
firms thrive; the average firm size increases. Second, firms are less decentralized
in economies with ineffective management technology. In an extended two-country
model incorporating international trade, I show that firms facing increasing import
competition flatten their hierarchies and use more incentive-based pay. Further-
more, I find that countries with superior management technology experience larger
welfare gains from opening up to trade and have larger trade shares.
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1 Introduction
Recent empirical research using firm-level survey data from various countries has substan-
tiated the existence of large variation in the quality of management technologies across
countries.1 Furthermore, the quality of management technologies has been shown to
have considerable impact on firm performance and organization (Bloom and Van Reenen
(2007, 2010), and Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012a)). However, relatively little is
known about the aggregate implications of differences in management technologies. More
specifically, how does the quality of management technologies affect the firm size distribu-
tion, the organizational structure of firms with different efficiency levels and the average
productivity of firms in an economy? To study these questions, I develop a general equi-
librium model of heterogeneous firms in differentiated product markets that incorporates
one type of management technology and endogenous managerial organization. I focus
on the canonical approach to modeling endogenous firm organization based on effort and
incentives, which have been empirically shown to be important dimensions of manage-
ment practice. I show that a management technology that allows firms to better monitor
and incentivize employees generates a selection effect that facilitates resource reallocation
from less efficient and smaller firms to more efficient and bigger firms. As a result, firms
are bigger, more decentralized, and more productive on average, when the management
technology improves.
This paper focuses on the quality of a particular type of management technology:
the ability to monitor and incentivize employees given a firm’s organizational choices.
From now on, for the sake of simplicity I use the term management technology (MT) to
refer to the management technology used to monitor and incentivize employees. I focus
on this dimension of MT because it is an important component of overall management
technology and affects firm performance substantially.2 This type of MT is soft technology
that consists of various management rules. Management rules that either specify regular
performance tracking and review or remove poor performers help a firm monitor workers
and punish shirking employees.
Large differences in the quality of MT are beyond the control of the firm. For instance,
low-quality institutions such as rigid labor markets and weak law enforcement negatively
affect the ability of firms to punish misbehaving employees (e.g., Bloom and Van Reenen
(2010) and Bloom et al. (2013)). Moreover, better management rules diffuse slowly across
borders and do not exist in many countries because of information barriers.3 Hence, I
treat MT as exogenous from the perspective of a firm, but allow firms to make endogenous
choices about management organization subject to this technology.
The economic objects I want to analyze interact together, and MT seems to play a role
in determining them. First, differences in the firm size distribution across countries have
implications for resource misallocation and aggregate productivity (Hsieh and Klenow
1For a discussion of management as a technology, see Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012b).
Management technologies defined in this paper are the same as management practices defined in Bloom
and Van Reenen (2007, 2010). Examples include good management rules to remove poor performers and
check employees’ behavior effectively.
2For details on the overall management quality and effects of monitoring and incentives on firm
performance, see Appendix 9.1.
3Bloom et al. (2013) pointed out that one major reason why Indian firms are poorly managed is that
their managers do not know about the existence of better management technologies.
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(2009)). Second, the organizational structure of firms matters for firm performance and
intra-firm wage inequality (Caliendo, Monte, and Rossi-Hansberg, 2014). Most impor-
tantly, all of these are systematically related to MT. For instance, Bloom et al. (2013)
argued that one major reason for why efficient firms can’t expand fast in India is that
they are unwilling to decentralize the production processes due to bad MT. Because of the
slow expansion of efficient firms, many small and inefficient firms survive in India, which
is one of the reasons why the aggregate productivity of firms is low in India. In summary,
MT is a candidate to explain differences in aggregate-level and firm-level outcomes across
economies.
This paper develops a general equilibrium model with two sectors. One sector is
a homogeneous sector. It is a perfectly competitive sector with a constant returns to
scale technology producing a homogeneous good. I assume that there are no monitoring
and incentive issues inside firms of this sector. The other sector which is the main
focus of my analysis is a monopolistically competitive sector. It comprises a continuum
of differentiated products with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) a` la Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977). For simplicity I refer to the monopolistically competitive sector henceforth
as the CES sector. The purpose of having the homogeneous sector is to endogenize the
expected wage of workers in the CES sector in a tractable way. The demand for these
products varies depending on their individual characteristics. An entrepreneur can enter
this sector by paying a fixed cost, and then she receives a random draw of demand (or
quality) for her product. The demand draw and the quality draw are isomorphic in this
framework, hence I will refer to them interchangeably. Once the entrepreneur observes
the quality, she decides whether or not to stay in the market as there is a fixed cost to
produce as well. In equilibrium, entrepreneurs in the monopolistically competitive sector
earn an expected payoff that is equal to their exogenous outside option due to free entry.4
Firms in the CES sector need to monitor and incentivize employees, as production
requires both time and effort, and the latter is costly for firms to observe. Following
the canonical approach to modeling monitoring and incentive problems within a firm
(i.e., Calvo and Wellisz (1978, 1979) and Qian (1994)), I assume that the firm sets up a
hierarchy to monitor workers and provide incentives. A hierarchy is an organization with
multiple layers, and a layer is a group of workers who have the same level of seniority. More
specifically, the firm allocates workers into different layers to make supervisors monitor
their direct subordinates and offer incentive-compatible wage contracts to workers. In
equilibrium, production workers (i.e., workers in the bottom layer) and non-production
workers are incentivized to exert effort to produce output and monitor subordinates
respectively.
Firms whose products have greater demand set up a hierarchy with more layers. In
addition to output and price, firms choose the number of layers as well as the span
of control at each layer. The span of control is defined as the ratio of the number of
supervisors to the number of their direct subordinates. When the firm wants to produce
more, it has to increase the span of control owing to the constraint of managerial talent
at the top. A larger span of control implies that less attention is paid to monitor each
subordinate which has to be compensated by a higher wage, since the firm needs to prevent
workers from shirking. As a result, the marginal cost (MC) increases. The firm can add a
layer and decrease the span of control to save wage payments to workers at existing layers,
4The expected payoff equals expected profit minus the disutility to exert effort.
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which makes the MC drop. However, this comes at the cost of extra wage payments
to workers at the new layer. In short, adding a layer is like an efficiency-enhancing
investment with a fixed cost. Firms whose goods are more preferred by consumers have
an incentive to set up a hierarchy with more layers, as they produce more in equilibrium.
In order to study the selection effect of improved MT, I consider a scenario in which
the quality of MT, which is common across firms, improves. This occurs when labor
markets are deregulated, or better management rules are introduced into an economy.
Such an improvement benefits all firms by reducing their labor costs. Furthermore, this
benefit is heterogeneous across firms. Firms with more layers (or bigger firms) gain dis-
proportionately more, since their average variable costs (AVCs) increase less rapidly with
output. Intuitively, firms that choose to have more layers expand more aggressively after
an improvement in MT. This aggressive expansion by bigger firms creates competitive
pressure on smaller firms. As a result, firms with the worst demand draws are forced to
leave the market, and firms with the best demand draws receive more profit and revenue.
In total, the selection effect appears after an improvement in MT.5
The selection effect discussed above yields three implications for resource reallocation
inside the CES sector. First, the resulting firm size distribution moves to the right
in the first-order-stochastic-dominance (FOSD) sense after an improvement in MT. In
other words, firms are bigger on average in economies with superior MT. This result is
consistent with the finding from Klenow and Olken (2014) that Mexico and India whose
firms have lower management scores than American firms have more small firms and
fewer big firms. Moreover, average firm size is much bigger in the U.S. compared with
India and Mexico. Second, all surviving firms either increase the number of layers or
make the span of control larger after an improvement in MT. Therefore, firms are more
decentralized in economies with superior MT, which is consistent with the findings in
Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012a) and Bloom et al. (2013). Finally, the aggregate
productivity of firms increases as a result of an improvement in MT as well. Gains in
aggregate productivity come from three sources. First, the least productive firms exit
the market after an improvement in MT, which is due to the selection effect. Second,
the market shares of the most productive firms increase after an improvement in MT,
which is due to the selection effect as well. Third, the productivity of surviving firms
increases, as improved MT reduces firm costs. In total, these three implications are the
aggregate implications of an improvement in MT and are the key contributions of this
paper compared to the literature. The key economic insight emphasized in this paper
(i.e., the selection effect arising from an improvement in MT) is pointed out for the first
5In a hypothetical world, if all firms were forced to have the same number of layers due to an infinitely
high cost of adding and dropping layers, the heterogeneous impact (and the exit of the smallest firms)
would disappear after MT improves. This is because all firms have the same AVC function. Therefore,
endogenous selection into the hierarchy with different numbers of layers is the key to generating a
heterogenous impact of an improvement in MT on firms with different demand draws.
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time in the literature and deserves more attention in future research.6
Most countries are open economies, and trade liberalization brings changes to welfare
and management practices of firms. I extend the baseline model into the international
context a` la Melitz (2003) to discuss how trade liberalization and firm management
interact with each other.7 At the firm level, the internal organization of firms changes
after trade liberalization. More specifically, non-exporting firms flatten their hierarchies
by reducing the number of layers and increasing the span of control. Furthermore, non-
exporters increase the amount of incentive-based pay when they delayers. Both results
are consistent with the findings from Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) that American firms
facing increasing import competition from Canada flattened their hierarchies and used
more incentive-based pay. At the country level, trade liberalization (a trade shock) and
an improvement in management quality (a management shock) complement each other
due to the selection effects provided by both of them. Trade liberalization favors bigger
firms, since they export. An improvement in management technology (MT) favors bigger
firms as well, as they choose to adopt management hierarchies with more layers. When
both shocks are present, two interesting results emerge. First, the increase in trade share
(i.e., imports divided by total income) from autarky to a costly trade regime is bigger for
economies with better MT. Due to the selection effect of an improvement in MT, firms
are bigger and more productive on average in autarky, if the country-level management
quality is higher. For a given level of reduction in the variable trade cost, this results in
a disproportionate increase in the number of exporting firms relative to the total number
of firms. This larger increase in the fraction of exporting firms leads to a larger trade
share when the economy opens up to trade. In short, a bigger fraction of firms trade in an
economy with better MT. Second, economies with superior MT benefit disproportionately
from opening up to trade under certain conditions. In other words, better MT amplifies
the welfare gains from trade (WGT) under certain conditions.8 The second result is
related to the first one, since the bigger increase in the trade share brings more foreign
varieties to domestic consumers (the variety effect) and reduces the ideal price index
of the CES goods more due to lower prices charged by foreign firms (the productivity
effect). In total, the interaction between the trade shock and the management shock
leads to systematic changes in aggregate trade variables.
Beyond the macro-level implications, the model has micro-level predictions as well.
First, although wages at all layers increase with firm size given the number of layers,
they fall at existing layers when the firm adds a layer. This reduction occurs because
the addition of a new layer reduces the span of control at existing layers. This result
shows that employees might lose from firm’s expansion. Second, when wages increase,
6Powell (2013) investigated how contract enforcement affects the dispersion of the distribution of firm
productivity in a perfectly competitive product market. One key result from that paper is that weak
enforcement of laws hurts unproductive firms more due to the existence of a fixed production cost and
a dynamic-enforcement constraint. As a result, the distribution of firm productivity is more dispersed
in economies with weaker enforcement of laws. Both Powell (2013) and my paper emphasize the role of
institutions in shaping aggregate productivity. Powell (2013) focused on the second-order moment of the
distribution of firm productivity, while my paper focuses on the first-order moment of it.
7Papers that incorporate the monitoring-based wage determination into an international trade model
include those by Copeland (1989), Matusz (1996), Chen (2011), and Davis and Harrigan (2011).
8In my model, WGT are not guaranteed. Whether or not there are WGT depends on parameters
values such as the elasticity of substitution and the quality of MT.
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they increase disproportionately more at upper layers, which leads to a bigger wage ratio
between two adjacent layers. Similarly, when wages fall, they fall disproportionately more
at upper layers, which leads to a smaller wage ratio between two adjacent layers. These
results imply a distributional effect of firm expansion on workers’ wages . Third, in the
theory, firms that are bigger or more efficient have more layers. This is because adding
a layer is like an investment that requires a “fixed” organization cost and reduces the
firm’s MC. In total, all the above results on firm-level outcomes are consistent with the
evidence presented in Caliendo, Monte, and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) and have implications
for intra- and inter-firm wage inequality.
The current paper also quantitatively evaluates how an improvement in MT affects
firm size, aggregate productivity and welfare. In order to implement counterfactual ex-
periments, I calibrate the model to match six moments obtained from the data of the
U.S. economic census. Then, I implement two counterfactual experiments by improving
the management quality for all firms in the economy. Calibration results show that an
improvement in MT has quantitatively important effects on aggregate productivity, firm
size and welfare. More specifically, a 22% improvement in MT results in a 22.2% increase
in the weighted average of firm productivity, a 72.2% increase in average employment,
and a 47.1% increase in welfare. Furthermore, its impact on the WGT is quantitatively
sizable as well. The WGT increase by about 1.21% after the improvement in MT. In
short, the calibrated model is able to generate quantitatively important effects of an
improvement in MT on aggregate-level economic outcomes.
This paper contributes to the literature on incentive-based hierarchies in three ways.9
First, I treat the number of layers as a discrete variable and manage to derive the optimal
number of layers for the firm by characterizing the firm’s cost functions. This is for the
first time in the research of incentive-based hierarchies that such a difficult problem has
been solved. Treating the number of layers as a discrete variable is empirically realistic
and important for the model’s predictions on wages and firm productivity. Second, firm
size is endogenously determined in my model, as each firm faces a downward-sloping
demand curve. The determination of optimal firm size is a central theoretical obstacle for
the research on incentive-based hierarchies. This paper manages to solve this problem by
considering the firm’s problem in a monopolistically competitive market environment.10
Finally, I incorporate the canonical model of incentive-based hierarchies into a general
equilibrium setting. By doing so, I can analyze the impact of improved MT on the firm
size distribution and weighted average of firm productivity, which are general equilibrium
objects. Furthermore, these implications can be readily contrasted with the data and
help explain the stylized patterns observed in the real world.
The literature on knowledge-based hierarchies (e.g., Garicano (2000), Garicano and
Rossi-Hansberg (2004, 2006, 2012), Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012)) has been suc-
cessful at providing a framework to analyze how the information and communication
technology (ICT) affects various economic outcomes such as wage inequality and eco-
9Earlier research papers on management hierarchies include those by Williamson (1967), Beckmann
(1977), and Keren and Levhari (1979) etc. For more details of research on incentive-based hierarchies,
see Mookherjee (2010).
10Calvo and Wellisz (1978) pointed out that firm size is undetermined in the standard model of
incentive-based hierarchies. Firm size in Qian (1994) is exogenously given, as the firm is assumed to
have a fixed amount of capital and a Leontief technology to produce. If the firm is allowed to choose the
amount of capital optimally, firm size goes to infinite, as pointed out by Meagher (2003).
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nomic growth. However, it is silent on the role of MT in determining firm-level outcomes
and aggregate economic variables such as the firm size distribution and aggregate pro-
ductivity. A paper that is closely related to mine is Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012).
There are three major differences between these two papers. First, the moral hazard
problem which is absent in Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) is a key ingredient of
this paper. I focus on a different mechanism (effort and incentives), and it yields some
different predictions such as what matters for the firm size distribution is not the ICT but
institutions that affect the ability of firms to monitor and incentivize employees. Second,
the focus of my paper is the selection effect of better MT in the closed economy, while
Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) focused on how trade liberalization affects firm orga-
nization and productivity in the open economy. Finally, this paper yields some important
micro-level predictions that Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) did not have. For ex-
ample, the result that firms increase the number of layers when MT improves is unique
to my model, since improvements in the ICT would imply flattened firm hierarchies (i.e.,
delayering). This difference is important, since the number of layers has been shown to be
an important factor determining firm performance and workers’ wages (Caliendo, Monte,
and Rossi-Hansberg (2012)).
This article contributes to the recent macro-development literature that discusses
cross-country differences in the firm size distribution and resource misallocation (e.g.,
Hsieh and Klenow (2009, 2012) and Hsieh and Olken (2014)) in two ways. First, this
paper provides a new explanation for why firms in developing countries are smaller and
less productive on average compared to those in developed countries. As pointed out by
Hsieh and Olken (2014), some prevailing arguments that are used to explain cross-country
differences in the firm size distribution face empirical challenges. For instance, size-
dependent policies which are commonly used in many developing countries would imply
bunching of firms around certain thresholds on firm size. However, this type of bunching
does not seem to be quantitatively important in the data, at least for India, Mexico and
Indonesia (Hsieh and Olken (2014)). Another popular view is that financial constraints
hurt smaller firms more than bigger firms in developing countries. This argument would
imply that developing countries have “missing middle” in the size distribution of firms.
That is, developing countries have both more small firms and more big firms compared
with developed countries. Moreover, there are fewer medium-sized firms in developing
countries compared with developed countries as well (i.e., a bimodal distribution of firm
size). Unfortunately, this feature does not seem to exist in the data as well (Hsieh and
Olken (2014)). On the contrary, the theory proposed in this paper does not have the above
counterfactual predictions. Second, the key economic insight of this paper that bigger
and more efficient firms are constrained more in developing countries (i.e., countries with
worse MT) is consistent with conjectures and suggestive evidence provided by Bloom
et al. (2013) and Hsieh and Olken (2014). In summary, this essay points out a new
channel through which differences in quality of MT affect the firm size distribution and
resource allocation. Furthermore, aggregate predictions of the theory are consistent with
the suggestive evidence.
This paper is related to the literature on heterogeneous firms and international trade
(e.g., Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003), Melitz (2003), Yeaple (2005) and Melitz
and Ottaviano (2007)). The current paper complements this literature by showing how
the organizational structure of the firm and the quality of MT affect the responses of
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firms and economies to trade liberalization. In particular, the WGT are impacted by the
quality of MT which is affected by institutional quality.
The current paper is also related to the literature that applies efficiency wage models
into the international context. Early contributions include Copeland (1989) and Matusz
(1996). More recently, Chen (2011) investigated how the consideration of the efficiency
wage affects multinational firms’ organizational choices (i.e, FDI or outsourcing). Davis
and Harrigan (2011) used the standard efficiency wage model (i.e., Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984)) to discuss how trade liberalization affects wages of various jobs (i.e., jobs in non-
exporting firms and exporting firms etc.) differently. The key departure of this paper from
the existing literature is the endogenous determination of the monitoring intensity (i.e.,
management quality). Firms endogenously determine their monitoring intensities, since
they make organizational choices. The endogenous formation of internal firm organization
is the key to generating the results on the changes in aggregate trade variables.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two solves the individual
firm’s optimization problem. Section three solves the problem of resource allocation in
general equilibrium. Section four investigates how differences in MT across economies
affect various aggregate economic outcomes. Section five extends the baseline model into
an international context a` la Melitz (2003) to investigate how the internal organization
of firms responds to bilateral trade liberalization. Section six studies how the quality of
MT affects the WGT as well as the trade share by treating the number of layers as a
continuous variable. Section seven calibrates the model to quantitatively evaluate how
an improvement in MT affects various aggregate economic outcomes including aggregate
productivity and the WGT. Section eight concludes.
2 Partial Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, I develop a model of the hierarchical firm that features firms’ endogenous
selection of a hierarchy with a specific number of layers. The key elements are the firm’s
decisions on the span of control as well as the number of layers. I will subsequently
introduce the model into a general equilibrium setting and solve the problem of resource
allocation in both the product and labor markets in the next section.
2.1 Environment
The economy comprises two sectors, L units of labor andN potential entrepreneurs, where
N is sufficiently large that the free entry (FE) condition discussed below will hold with
equality. One sector produces a homogeneous good and is perfectly competitive, while
the other sector produces horizontally differentiated goods and features monopolistic
competition.
A representative agent demands goods from both sectors and has the following Cobb-
Douglas utility function:
U =
(Cc
γ
)γ( Ch
1− γ
)1−γ
− Iψ(ai), (1)
where Ch is the consumption of the homogeneous good and Cc is an index of consumption
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of differentiated goods defined as
Cc =
(∫
Ω
θ
1
σ y(θ)
σ−1
σ Mµ(θ)dθ
) σ
σ−1
, (2)
y(θ) is the consumption of variety θ, M denotes the mass of products available to the
consumer, µ(θ) indicates the probability distribution over the available varieties in Ω,
and σ > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution. Note that θ is a demand shifter for
a variety produced by a firm, so agents demand more of goods with higher θ at a given
price. I and ψ(ai) are, respectively, an indicator function and a disutility to exert effort
that will be discussed later. The final composite good is defined as
C ≡
(Cc
γ
)γ( Ch
1− γ
)1−γ
, (3)
which is the first part of terms appearing in the right hand side of equation (1). I choose
the price of it to be the numeraire, so
P γp1−γh ≡ 1, (4)
where
P =
(∫
Ω
θp(θ)1−σMµ(θ)dθ
) 1
1−σ
(5)
is the ideal price index of the differentiated goods. ph is the price of the homogeneous
good, and p(θ) is the price of variety θ.
The homogeneous sector features no frictions, and the perfectly competitive market
structure implies that firms receive zero profit. Labor is the only factor used in produc-
tion, and the production technology implies that output equals the number of workers
employed. The price of the homogeneous good is also the wage offered in this sector.
There is no unemployment among workers who enter this sector in equilibrium owing to
the absence of frictions.
The CES sector produces a continuum of differentiated products. The demand for
these products varies depending on their individual characteristics. There is a large pool
of potential entrepreneurs who have managerial ability to set up firms in this sector. An
entrepreneur can enter this sector and receive a random draw of quality for her product
after paying a fixed cost f1 to design it. Given the existence of a fixed cost f0 to produce,
the entrepreneur decides whether or not to stay in the market after she observes the
draw. Both the entry cost and the fixed cost are paid in the form of the final composite
good, as in Atkeson and Burstein (2010). The entrepreneur has to employ workers and
organize the production process if she decides to produce.
Workers choose the sector in which they seek employment, while entrepreneurs choose
whether or not to operate a firm. Both types of agents are risk neutral. In equilibrium,
workers’ expected payoff obtained from entering both sectors must be the same since
they can freely move between sectors. I assume that the outside option (or reservation
utility) of an entrepreneur is forgone, if she chooses to enter the CES sector. Thus,
the expected payoff of entrepreneurs who choose to enter the CES sector equals their
9
exogenous outside option f2 due to free entry of firms in equilibrium.
11 Workers cannot
choose to be entrepreneurs, as they don’t have managerial talents. Furthermore, I assume
that f2 is big enough that the expected payoff of workers is strictly smaller than f2 in
equilibrium. Therefore, entrepreneurs have no incentives to become workers.
2.2 The Organization of Production
I follow the literature on incentive-based hierarchies (e.g., Calvo and Wellisz (1978, 1979))
in modeling the organization of production. More specifically, I assume that each firm
has to employ workers at various layers and incentivize them to exert effort in order to
produce. Production workers only produce output, while non-production workers only
monitor their direct subordinates in order to incentivize them to work.12
Production requires effort and time of workers. The worker’s effort choice ai is assumed
to be a binary variable between working and shirking (i.e., ai ∈ {0, 1}) for reasons of
tractability.13 The input of workers’ time equals the number of workers. Production
workers produce output, and shirking results in defective output that cannot be sold.
Thus, the production function is
q =
∫ mT
0
a(j)dj, (6)
where mT is the measure of production workers and a(j) is the effort level of the j-th unit
of labor inputs. Here I assume that labor inputs are divisible, because there is a continuum
of workers. Non-production workers at layer i monitor their direct subordinates at layer
i + 1 and need to be monitored by supervisors at layer i − 1 as well.14 Layer T is
the lowest layer in the hierarchy which is occupied by production workers. In short,
production workers and non-production workers have different roles in the production
process.
Workers must be monitored if the firm wants them to exert effort. The firm cannot
fire a shirking worker unless it is able to detect his misbehavior. A worker at layer i is
induced to work for wage wi, if and only if
wi − ψ ≥ (1− pi)wi, (7)
11Essentially, I assume that there is another sector which is not explicitly modelled here. The en-
trepreneur can enter and receive the payoff of f2 by working in that sector.
12Most firms monitor and incentivize their employees in reality. For real-world examples, see http:
//matthewoudendyk.blogspot.com/2006/11/how-monitoring-is-being-do_116260155005227748.
html and http://management.about.com/cs/people/a/MonitorEE062501.htm. Management activ-
ities used to monitor and incentivize employees include a variety of jobs done by supervisors. First,
supervisors monitor their subordinates using information technology such as video surveillance, e-mail
scanning and location monitoring (Hubbard (2000, 2003)). Second, monitoring also happens when
supervisors communicate with their subordinates and try to check whether or not the subordinates are
working hard. Finally, business meetings in which supervisors evaluate subordinates’ performance and
decide whether or not to fire poor performers are important parts of monitoring and incentivizing activ-
ities as well. Admittedly, monitoring and incentivizing subordinates are parts of what non-production
workers do in reality. I focus on this dimension of non-production workers’ jobs in order to distill the
key economic impact of an improvement in MT on economic outcomes.
13As shown in Appendix 9.2, it is straightforward to generalize the analysis to allow effort to be a
continuous variable.
14A smaller i denotes a higher layer in the firm’s hierarchy, and the entrepreneur is at layer zero.
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where pi(≤ 1) is the probability of catching and firing a shirking worker, and ψ is the
disutility of exerting effort. A worker’s utility differs from the utility of consuming goods
only when he works in the CES sector and exerts effort in the production process (i.e.,
I = 1 in equation (1)). The above inequality is the incentive compatibility constraint
that the payoff obtained from exerting effort must be greater than or equal to that of
shirking.
The probability of catching and firing a shirking worker depends on two factors: the
adjusted span of control and MT. First, the bigger the adjusted span of control, the
less frequently a subordinate’s behavior is checked by his supervisor (less time or mon-
itoring effort is spent on him). This implies a lower probability of catching a shirking
worker. Second, the quality of MT affects the probability of detecting workers’ misbe-
havior. Management rules that clarify performance measures lead to easier detection of
workers’ misbehavior. Finally, the quality of MT also affects the probability of success-
fully firing shirking workers. Firms that are located in economies with either rigid labor
markets or weak law enforcement are found to be worse at using good management rules
to remove poor performers (Bloom and Van Reenen (2010)). I capture these effects by
assuming the following functional form for p(b, xi):
p(b, xi) =
1
bxi(θ)
, (8)
where xi(θ) ≡ mi(θ)∫mi−1
0 a(j)dj
is the span of control adjusted by supervisors’ effort inputs.15
Parameter b reflects the inefficiency of MT. More specifically, the worse the MT is, the
bigger the value of b.
A firm may want to hire non-production workers, since it wants to economize on
the cost to incentivize workers. I use Figures 1 and 2 to clarify the economic intuition
behind this choice.16 Consider firm A that receives a low demand draw θA and wants
to produce two units of goods as illustrated in Figure 1. The span of control of the
entrepreneur is small for this firm, which implies a low incentive-compatible wage paid
to production workers. Thus, it is optimal to have production workers only, since non-
production workers do not produce output. Next, consider firm B that receives a high
demand draw θB and wants to produce six units of goods, which is illustrated in Figure
2. The incentive-compatible wage paid to production workers would be too high, if
the firm did not hire non-production workers between the entrepreneur and production
workers.17 If the firm hires non-production workers who monitor production workers,
the incentive-compatible wage paid to production workers will be reduced, which makes
the labor costs lower. Obviously, this comes at the cost of extra wage payment to non-
production workers. Therefore, it is optimal for the firm to add non-production workers
only when the output level is high, which will be shown rigourously in Subsection 2.3. The
above logic also explains why the firm wants to have multiple layers of non-production
workers when the output level is high. In total, the trade-off between lower wages paid to
15As what I will show, the entrepreneur allocates the monitoring intensities evenly across workers at
the same layer. A more flexible functional form is p(b, xi) =
1
bxi(θ)ν
where ν can be different from one.
Allowing ν to differ from one does not affect qualitative results of the paper. Detailed derivations are
available upon request.
16These two figures only serve for illustrative purposes.
17Remember that there is a fixed number of entrepreneurs (i.e., one entrepreneur) at the top.
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Figure 1: A Firm with Two Layers
existing workers and extra wages paid to workers employed at the new layer determines
the optimal choice of the number of layers for a firm.
I characterize two optimal choices of the firm before solving the firm’s optimal de-
cisions on the other variables (e.g., output and employment etc.), as these two choices
are independent of the firm’s decisions on the other variables. In equilibrium, the firm
chooses to incentivize all workers to work and allocate the monitoring intensities evenly
across workers at a given layer. Intuitively, the firm can always reduce the cost by doing
so, if these choices are not made. Lemma 1 proves and summarizes the above results.
Lemma 1 The firm incentivizes all workers to work (i.e., ai = 1) and equalizes the
monitoring intensity across workers at a given layer.
Proof. See Appendix 9.3.1.
The entrepreneur faces the same incentive problem as her employees. She sits at
the top of the hierarchy and is monitored by nobody. However, the entrepreneur of any
firm that chooses to stay in the market is incentivized to exert effort in equilibrium (i.e.,
monitor her subordinates). First, staying in the market and shirking result in zero output
and negative payoff for the entrepreneur. Second, the net payoff must be non-negative
for the entrepreneur, if she decides to stay in the market and exert effort. This is because
the entrepreneur would exit the market, if the ex-post net payoff that is the difference
between profit and the cost to exert effort were negative. Therefore, the entrepreneur
exerts effort if she decides to stay in the market.
Now I characterize the firm’s optimization problem. By substituting equation (8) into
inequality (7), I derive the minimum incentive-compatible wage for layer i as follows:
wi(θ) =
ψ
pi(b, xi(θ))
= ψbxi. (9)
The key feature of the above equation is that the minimum incentive compatible wage
wi(θ) is negatively related to the supervision intensity. This relationship finds support
12
Figure 2: A Firm with Three Layers
in the data; see, for example, Rebitzer (1995) and Groshen and Krueger (1990).18 Based
on equations (1), (6), (9) and Lemma 1, the optimization problem for a firm with the
quality draw θ conditional on its staying in the market can be stated as
max{mi}Ti=1,T Aθ
1
σm
σ−1
σ
T −
T∑
i=1
bψmixi (10)
s.t. xi =
mi
mi−1
,
m0 = 1.
where the first part of the above equation is the firm’s revenue and the second part
denotes the variable cost. The demand shifter A captures market size adjusted by the
ideal price index and takes the following form:
A ≡
( γE
P 1−σ
)1/σ
, (11)
where E is the total income of the economy. The number of entrepreneurs per firm is
normalized to one, or, m0 = 1. A big enough b is chosen to ensure that the probability
of being monitored for any worker is always smaller than or equal to one.
The firm’s optimal decisions given the number of layers can be solved in two steps.
First, given an output level q, the first order conditions (FOCs) with respect to mi’s
18First, Rebitzer (1995) finds empirical evidence of a trade-off between supervision intensity and wage
payment. Workers get paid less if they are under intensive monitoring. More importantly, Groshen and
Krueger (1990) and Ewing and Payne (1999) find evidence on a negative relationship between the span
of control and the wage paid to subordinates. This finding directly supports the basic trade-off of wage
determination in the current model. Namely, a bigger span of control results in higher wage payment to
subordinates.
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imply
wTmT = 2wT−1mT−1 = ... = 2T−1w1m1, (12)
where m0 = 1 and mT = q, as the number of production workers equals output q. This
leads to the solution that
mi(q, T ) = 2
i
( q
2T
) 2T−2T−i
2T−1
, (13)
which is the number of workers at layer i. Thus, the firm’s span of control at layer i is
xi(q, T ) =
mi+1(q, T )
mi(q, T )
= 2
( q
2T
) 2T−(i+1)
2T−1
, (14)
which increases with q given the number of layers. Equation (13) shows that employment
at each layer increases with output given the number of layers. Moreover, equation (14)
indicates that the number of workers increases disproportionately more at upper layers,
which leads to a bigger span of control at each layer. This is due to the fixed number of
entrepreneurs at the top.
Second, optimizing over output yields
q(θ, T ) = mT (θ, T ) =
[
Aβθ
1
σ
bψ2
2− T
2T−1
] σ(2T−1)
σ+(2T−1)
, (15)
which is the firm’s output level as well as the number of production workers. Substituting
equations (13) and (15) into equation (10) leads to the firm’s operating profit (i.e., profit
before paying the fixed cost) and revenue as
pi(θ, T ) = (1− β(2
T − 1)
2T
)(Aθ
1
σ )
2T σ
σ+(2T−1)
(
β/bψ(
2
2T+1−2−T
2T−1
))
(σ−1)(2T−1)
σ+(2T−1)
(16)
and
S(θ, T ) = (Aθ
1
σ )
2T σ
σ+(2T−1)
(
β/bψ(
2
2T+1−2−T
2T−1
))
(σ−1)(2T−1)
σ+(2T−1)
, (17)
which will be used later. The firm’s employment, output, and revenue increase continu-
ously with the quality draw θ given the number of layers. More importantly, all of these
variables increase discontinuously when the firm adds a layer as shown below. With the
firm’s optimal decisions on employment and output in hand, I can solve for the optimal
number of layers, which is the final step to solve the firm’s optimization problem.
2.3 Endogenous Selection into the Hierarchy with Different Num-
bers of Layers
This subsection characterizes a firm’s cost functions in order to solve for the optimal
number of layers in a firm’s hierarchy. The key result is that firms with better quality
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draws choose to have more layers and produce more in equilibrium. Consider a firm that
produces q units of output. The variable cost function of such a firm is given by19
TV C(q, b) = min
T≥1
TV CT (q, b),
where TV C(q, b) is the minimum variable cost of producing q and TV CT (q, b) is the
minimum variable cost of producing q using a management hierarchy with T + 1 layers.
Based on equations (13) and (14), TV CT (q, b) is derived as
TV CT (q, b) =
T∑
i=1
mi(q, T )wi(q, T ) =
T∑
i=1
bψ
m2i (q, T )
mi−1(q, T )
= (2− 1
2T−1
)bψ21−
T
2T−1 q
2T
2T−1 .
(18)
Variable cost given the number of layers increases with output. Better MT, which is
denoted by a smaller value of b, pushes down the variable cost given any number of layers
proportionately.
With the firm’s cost functions given different numbers of layers in hand, I can char-
acterize the AVC curve and the MC curve using the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Given the number of layers, both the average variable cost and the marginal
cost increase continuously with output. The average variable cost curve kinks and its slope
decreases discontinuously at the output level where the firm adds a layer. As a result,
firms that produce more have more layers. The marginal cost falls discontinuously when
the firm adds a layer.
Proof. See Appendix 9.3.2.
Figure 3 illustrates the AVC curve and the MC curve. The AVC curve denoted by
the bold green curve is the lower envelope of all AVC curves given different numbers of
layers. The MC curve does not increase with output monotonically. The span of control
increases at all layers when the firm increases output and keeps the number of layers
unchanged. Therefore, wages increase at all layers, which implies that both the AVC
and the MC increase with output given the number of layers. Wages fall at existing
layers when the firm adds a layer owing to the smaller span of control. This leads to
a discontinuous decrease in the MC. Because of this drop, the AVC curve kinks and its
slope decreases discontinuously at the output level where the firm adds a layer.
Proposition 1 establishes a positive relationship between output and the optimal num-
ber of layers. When the output level is low, it is ideal to have a smaller number of layers.
This is because adding a layer is like an investment that reduces the MC at the expense
of a fixed cost. This property of the AVC curve is evident in Figure 3, as the AVC curve
given a bigger number of layers has a smaller slope and a larger intercept on the y axis.
Similarly, it is optimal to have more layers when output is high. In summary, the number
of layers and output increase hand in hand in equilibrium.
What is the relationship between the firm’s demand draw and the optimal number of
layers? The key observation is that it is more profitable for a firm with a better demand
19For firms that have one layer (i.e., self-employed entrepreneurs), management hierarchies are not
needed. As this paper focuses on management hierarchies, I do not consider these firms in the paper.
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Figure 3: Average Variable Cost and Marginal Cost
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draw to add a layer. This is due to the key feature of the AVC curve that adding a layer
is like investing a fixed amount of money to reduce the MC. In other words, there is a
complementarity between the level of the firm’s demand draw and its incentives to add
a layer. Proposition 2 characterizes a positive relationship between the firm’s demand
draw and the optimal number of layers by proving this complementarity.
Proposition 2 Firms that receive better demand draws have more layers.
Proof. See Appendix 9.3.3.
Proposition 2 and the distinctive feature of the AVC curve discussed above are the
keys to understanding the selection effect of an improvement in MT. Improved MT re-
duces labor costs and incentivizes firms to grow. Furthermore, it incentivizes firms with
better demand draws to expand more and benefits them disproportionately more. This
is because firms with better demand draws have more layers, and the elasticity of the
AVC with respect to output is smaller for these firms.
The theoretical results proven in Proposition 2 are consistent with empirical findings
from Caliendo, Monte, and Rossi-Hansberg (2012). First, firms that are bigger in terms
of either employment or value added are found to have more layers in the data set of
French firms. Second, firms that are bigger are found to have more layers as well. All
these evidence supports the key result of this paper: firms with better demand draws
have more layers.
I close this subsection by discussing how price and firm size respond to a change in
the firm’s demand draw. These results are useful, since I am going to analyze the firm
size distribution in the next section. Proposition 3 summarizes the results.
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Figure 4: Average Variable Cost and the Demand Draw
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Proposition 3 Given the number of layers, output, employment, and price increase con-
tinuously with the firm’s demand draw. When the firm adds a layer, output and employ-
ment increase discontinuously, while price falls discontinuously.
Proof. See Appendix 9.3.4.
The strategy of a firm to grow depends crucially on whether or not the production
is reorganized. When the firm grows and keeps the number of layers unchanged, price
increases as the MC increases. However, when one layer is added, the MC falls, which
leads to lower prices. Exactly because of this discontinuous decrease in the MC, firm
size increases discontinuously when production is reorganized. As a result, the AVC as a
function of the demand draw jumps when the firm adds a layer, as shown in Figure 4.20
2.4 The Spans of Control, Wages, and Relative Wages
The incentive-based hierarchy proposed above has predictions for firm-level outcomes.
This subsection presents predictions on the spans of control, wages, and relative wages.
The first two variables increase with the demand draw given the number of layers, and
they decrease discontinuously when firms add a layer as in Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg
(2012). In addition, the relative wage, defined as the ratio of the supervisor’s wage to
his direct subordinate’s wage, behaves in a way consistent with the findings of Caliendo,
Monte, and Rossi-Hansberg (2012).
20The optimal output level is substituted into the firm’s AVC function for calculating the AVC as a
function of the demand draw.
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What happens to the firm-level outcomes when the firm expands due to an improve-
ment in the quality of its product and keeps the number of layers unchanged? Proposition
4 summarizes the results.
Proposition 4 Given the number of layers, both the span of control and wages increase
with the firm’s quality draw at all layers. Furthermore, relative wages increase with the
firm’s quality draw at all layers as well.
Proof. See Appendix 9.3.5.
The change in the span of control is the key to understanding this proposition. When the
firm is constrained to keep the number of layers unchanged, the only way to expand is to
increase the span of control at all layers. When the span of control is larger, monitoring
is less effective, which implies that higher wages are needed to incentivize workers. Fur-
thermore, wages increase disproportionately more at upper layers. The share of workers
at upper layers in total employment decreases, when the firm grows without adjusting
the number of layers. Thus, the firm tolerates disproportionately more increases in wages
at upper layers while keeping increases in wages at lower layers relatively small.
The results of Proposition 4 are consistent with the evidence presented in Caliendo,
Monte, and Rossi-Hansberg (2012). First, given the number of layers, wages are found
to increase with firm size in both cross-sectional and time-series regressions. These re-
sults are what the model predicts, as the bigger demand draw leads to bigger firm size.
Second, and more importantly, relative wages are shown to increase with firm size at all
layers when the firm does not change the number of layers. This prediction implies that,
although workers all gain when a firm expands without reorganization, workers at higher
layers gain more. This unambiguous prediction is a unique prediction of my model, as the
model presented in Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) is silent on how relative wages
change when the firm expands.
When the firm chooses to add a layer owing to an improvement in the quality of its
product, the firm-level outcomes move in the opposite direction, as summarized by the
following proposition.21
Proposition 5 When the firm adds a layer owing to a marginal improvement in the qual-
ity of its product, both the span of control and wages fall at existing layers. Furthermore,
relative wages decrease at existing layers as well.
Proof. See Appendix 9.3.6.
The change in the span of control is again the key to understanding this proposition.
When the firm expands by adding a layer, the constraint at the top (i.e., the fixed supply
of entrepreneurs) is relaxed. Thus, the firm can expand and economize on its labor cost
at the same time. As a result, the span of control decreases at existing layers, which
leads to lower wages paid to employees at existing layers. On top of that, wages fall
disproportionately more at upper layers. The share of workers at upper layers in total
employment increases after an addition of a layer, since the span of control is reduced.
21As in Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), I assume that the firm adds a layer from above. As the
entrepreneur is at layer zero, layer i becomes layer i+1 where i ≥ 1, when the entrepreneur adds a layer.
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Consequently, it is an efficient way to economize on labor cost by reducing their wages
disproportionately more.
The results of Proposition 5 are consistent with the evidence presented in Caliendo,
Monte, and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) as well. First, wages are found to decrease at existing
layers when firms expand by adding a layer. Second, relative wages fall at existing
layers as well for firms that expand and add a layer. In total, the model’s predictions on
wages and relative wages are consistent with the empirical findings presented in Caliendo,
Monte, and Rossi-Hansberg (2012).
2.5 Firm Productivity
I discuss firm productivity and its relationship with output in this subsection. Following
Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), I use the inverse of unit costs (i.e., output divided
total costs) to measure firm productivity and analyze how the unit costs vary with output
as well as the number of layers.
Formally, the unit costs given a number of layers and the inefficiency of MT are
defined as
UCT (q, b) ≡ TV CT (q, b) + f0
q
= AV CT (q, b) + AFC(q), (19)
where f0 is the fixed production cost, and AFC(q) is the average fixed cost. The unit
costs given the inefficiency of MT are defined as
UC(q, b) ≡ TV C(q, b) + f0
q
= AV C(q, b) + AFC(q). (20)
As the fixed production cost does not affect the choice of the number of layers, equation
(20) can be restated as
UC(q, b) = UCT (q, b), ∀q ∈ [qT−1, qT ),
where qT is defined as the solution to AV CT (qT , b) = AV CT+1(qT , b). In what follows, I
discuss how UCT (q, b) and UC(q, b) vary with output.
First, the curve of unit costs given the number of layers and the inefficiency of MT
is “U”-shaped. In other words, it decreases first and increases afterwards. Note that the
average fixed cost (AFC) always decreases with output, while the AVC always increases
with output. The decrease in AFC dominates the increase in AVC when output increases
from a low level and vice versa. Thus, the unit costs given a number of layers decrease
until output exceeds a threshold. Furthermore, the slope of the curve approaches zero
when output goes to infinity, as both the decrease in AFC and the increase in AVC
triggered by an increase in output become infinitesimally small.
Second, I discuss the relationship between curves of the unit costs given various num-
bers of layers. I define the minimum efficient scale (MES) given a number of layers as
the scale of production at which a firm minimizes unit costs given the number of layers,
and the minimum unit costs (MUC) given a number of layers as the unit costs when the
scale of production is at its MES. Mathematically, the MES given b and T is defined as
qTm(b) ≡ argminq UCT (q, b). (21)
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And the MUC given b and T is defined as
MUCT (b) ≡ UCT (qTm(b), b). (22)
What is the relationship between various MUCT (b) given different numbers of layers?
The following assumption assures that MUCT (b) decreases with T , which implies that
the hierarchy with more layers has a lower MUC.
Assumption 1 f0 > 4bψ.
Under this assumption, firm productivity has an increasing overall trend with respect to
output. On the contrary, firm productivity has an decreasing overall trend with respect
to output, if Assumption 1 is violated.22 Economically, Assumption 1 requires that MT
is efficient enough (i.e., b is small enough). I assume that Assumption 1 holds in what
follows, since the estimated parameters from a calibrated model presented presented in
Section 7 satisfy this constraint.
Now, I characterize properties of qTm(b), MUCT (b), and UCT (q, b) using the following
proposition.
Proposition 6 Given the number of layers and the inefficiency of MT, the curve of unit
costs is “U”-shaped, and the slope of it approaches zero when output goes to infinity.
Under Assumption 1, the MES given the number of layers increases with the number of
layers; the MUC given the number of layers decreases with the number of layers.
Proof. See Appendix 9.3.7.
The inefficiency of MT is the key to understanding this proposition. Improved MT
makes the MES increase and the MUC decrease given the number of layers. Moreover,
firms with more layers gain disproportionately more from such an improvement, as the
share of the total variable cost in total costs is bigger for these firms. Thus, the MES
increases more and the MUC decreases more for firms with more layers after an improve-
ment in MT. As a result, the MES increases with the number of layers, and the MUC
decreases with the number of layers when MT is efficient enough.
As firm productivity is simply the inverse of its unit costs, I characterize the overall
shape of the curve of firm productivity using the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Given the number of layers, the curve of firm productivity is inversely “U”-
shaped. Under Assumption 1, the maximum value of firm productivity given the number
of layers increases with the number of layers.
22One implication here is that the positive correlation between firm productivity and size is stronger
in economies with better MT, and this correlation may be negative when the quality of MT is sufficiently
low. Interestingly, Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2013) found that the positive correlation
between firm productivity and size is much stronger in developed countries such as the U.S. and Germany
compared with developing countries such as Hungary and Slovenia. In Romania, the covariance between
firm productivity and size is even negative. Although there are no management data for firms in Hungary,
Slovenia and Romania, firms in Poland which is also a central European country have lower management
scores compared with firms in the U.S. and Germany. Therefore, the finding in Bartelsman, Haltiwanger,
and Scarpetta (2013) supports my productivity measure.
20
Figure 5: Firm Size and Productivity
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Figure 5 illustrates how firm productivity varies with output. The overall trend is that
firm productivity increases with output. This implies that small firms are less productive
on average. Aggregate productivity increases if the smallest firms exit the market after
some shocks. This is one impact of improved MT on aggregate productivity which I will
analyze in the next section.
3 General Equilibrium Analysis
I close the model by aggregating across firms and solve for the general equilibrium in this
subsection. There are two product markets and one labor market. Entrepreneurs decide
whether or not to enter the CES sector and must be indifferent between entering or not
in equilibrium due to the large pool of potential entrepreneurs. Workers choose which
sector and which labor submarket to enter.23 They must be indifferent between sectors
and various labor submarkets in equilibrium, since they can freely move across sectors
and firms.
3.1 Product Market Equilibrium
There are two equilibrium conditions for the CES sector: the zero cutoff payoff (ZCP)
condition and the free entry (FE) condition. They are used to pin down two equilibrium
variables: the exit cutoff for the quality draw (i.e., θ¯) and the mass of active firms in
equilibrium (i.e., M). First, the ZCP condition that firms with the quality draw θ¯ earn
23I will explain what labor submarkets mean in what follows.
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zero payoff can be written as
Π(θ¯, A) = 0, (23)
where Π(θ¯, A) ≡ pi(θ¯, T (θ¯, A), A) − (f0 + ψ) is the entrepreneur’s payoff. This condition
pins down the exit cutoff θ¯ given the adjusted market size A. Note that the ZCP con-
dition here incorporates both the fixed cost to produce and the cost of exerting effort,
as entrepreneurs of active firms exert effort to monitor their subordinates in equilibrium.
For simplicity, I use f ≡ f0 + ψ to denote the overall “fixed cost” to produce.
The FE entry condition implies that the expected payoff obtained from entering the
CES sector equals the outside option of entrepreneurs, or∫ ∞
θ¯
Π(θ, A)g(θ)dθ = fe, (24)
where fe ≡ f1 + f2 is the overall opportunity cost to enter the CES sector, and g(θ) is
the probability density function (PDF) of the quality draw θ. This equation determines
the adjusted market size A given the exit cutoff θ¯.
The mass of firms is undetermined in the homogeneous sector, and the managerial
talent is not needed for firms in the homogeneous sector. Given the assumptions of a
linear production technology and perfect competition in the homogeneous sector, firm
boundaries are not defined in that sector. Therefore, I assume that entrepreneurs choose
whether or not to enter the CES sector. In equilibrium, the FE condition holds with
equality if and only if
N ≥ M
1−G(θ¯) ,
where M is the mass of active firms in equilibrium, and G(θ) is the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of θ. A sufficiently large N ensures that the above inequality holds.
The equilibrium condition for the homogeneous sector is that supply of the homoge-
neous good equals the demand for it, or
phLh = (1− γ)E, (25)
where Lh is the number of workers in the homogeneous sector. This condition pins down
ph, which is the price of the homogeneous good as well as workers’ wages in this sector.
3.2 Labor Market Equilibrium
The labor market in the CES sector is characterized by competitive search. Firms demand
workers for each layer, and a worker chooses one type of job to apply for in order to
maximize the expected payoff. Firms randomly select workers among those who come to
apply for jobs to employ. A type of job corresponds to a firm-layer pair (θ, i), as different
firms offer different wages for various positions (i.e., layers). In other words, there are
labor submarkets indexed by (θ, i) in the CES sector. As workers are homogeneous and
can freely choose which type of job to apply for, the expected payoff from applying for
any type of job must be the same in equilibrium. Moreover, this uniform expected payoff
must be equal to the wage offered in the homogeneous sector, which is the outside option
of workers entering the CES sector. In total, I have
mi(θ)
Q(θ, i)
(wi(θ)− ψ) = mi
′ (θ
′
)
Q(θ′ , i′)
(wi′ (θ
′
)− ψ) = ph ∀ (i, i′) ∀ (θ, θ′), (26)
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where mi(θ) is the firm’s labor demand at layer i(≥ 1), and Q(θ, i) is the number of
workers who come to apply for this type of job. mi(θ)
Q(θ,i)
is the probability of being employed
in labor submarket (θ, i), and (wi(θ)− ψ) is the net payoff of being employed. Different
job turn-down rates across labor submarkets (i.e., Q(θ,i)−mi(θ)
Q(θ,i)
≥ 0) are needed to equalize
the expected payoff obtained from entering various labor submarkets. As a result, there
is unemployment in equilibrium.
I derive the labor-market-clearing condition in two steps. First, the number of workers
who choose to enter the CES sector (i.e., Lc) can be derived from the worker’s indifference
condition in equation (26), or
Lc =
∫ ∞
θ=θ¯
T (θ,A)∑
i=1
Q(θ, i)
Mg(θ)
1−G(θ¯)dθ
=
WP (θ¯, A,M)− ψLD(θ¯, A,M)
ph
, (27)
where WP (θ¯, A,M) is the total wage payment in the CES sector, and LD(θ¯, A,M) is
the number of workers employed in the CES sector,24 or
LD =
∫ ∞
θ=θ¯
T (θ,A)∑
i=1
m(θ, i)
Mg(θ)
1−G(θ¯)dθ. (28)
Equation (27) has an intuitive explanation. It says that the total expected payoff of
workers entering the CES sector (i.e., phLc due to the indifference condition) is equal to
the difference between the total wage payment and the total disutility to exert effort.
Second, the labor-market-clearing condition indicates that the number of workers
employed in the homogeneous sector is the difference between the endowment of labor
and the number of workers who choose to enter the CES sector, or
Lh = L− Lc. (29)
Equations (27) and (29) are two labor market equilibrium conditions that are used to
determine the allocation of labor between sectors.
3.3 Equilibrium and Unemployment
The market-clearing condition of the final composite good implies that
E =
∫ ∞
θ¯
LC(θ)
Mg(θ)
1−G(θ¯)dθ + phLh +
[
f0 + f1
( θ¯
θmin
)k]
M +
[
ψ + f2
( θ¯
θmin
)k]
M, (30)
where LC(θ) is the total wage payment of firms with demand draw θ. The third part of
the right hand side (RHS) of equation (30) is the demand for the final composite good
by firms, and the last part of the RHS of equation (30) is the consumption of active
24For further discussion of the labor market equilibrium in the CES sector, see Appendix 9.3.8.
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entrepreneurs who earn profit in equilibrium.25 Total income of the economy equals
total expenditure which includes two parts: demand from workers and demand from
firms. Note that only workers and active entrepreneurs demand goods in equilibrium.
Entrepreneurs who choose not to enter the CES sector receive their outside option without
consuming goods; entrepreneurs who enter the CES sector and choose not to produce
don’t consume goods as their income is zero.
The general equilibrium of this economy is characterized by the quality threshold
of the firm that obtains zero payoff, θ¯, the mass of firms that operate M , the price
of the homogeneous good ph, the labor allocation between two sector, Lc and Lh, and
the aggregate income E. These six equilibrium variables are obtained by solving the six
equations (i.e., equations (23), (24), (25), (27), (29) and (30)). Obviously, one equilibrium
condition is redundant due to Walras’ law, and I normalize the price of the final composite
good to one.
One implicit assumption for the existence of the equilibrium is that the probability of
being employed implied by equation (27) is smaller than or equal to one in every labor
submarket in equilibrium. In other words, wages offered in the CES sector must satisfy
wi(θ)− ψ ≥ ph ∀ (i, θ), (31)
where wi(θ) is determined in equation (9). The above inequality would be violated if ψ
were zero. Firms do not need to pay incentive-compatible wages to workers, if exerting
effort does not generate any cost to them. At the same time, there is no unemployment
in all labor submarkets, and every worker in the CES sector receives the same wage. I
don’t consider this case, since information friction and MT do not matter in this case. In
the paper, I focus on the case in which unemployment exists in every labor submarket,
and the incentive-compatible wage determined in equation (9) satisfies the constraint
specified in equation (31) in every labor submarket. There are three reasons why I
want to investigate this type of equilibrium. First, the model yields clean insights and
testable implications in this case. Second, the testable implications at the micro-level
(e.g., wages, relative wages, and the optimal number of layers etc.) have been shown
to be consistent with the evidence presented in Caliendo, Monte, and Rossi-Hansberg
(2012). Finally, as shown below, the model’s predictions at the aggregate level (i.e.,
effects of improved MT on the firm size distribution and firm organization) are consistent
with the evidence presented in Hsieh and Klenow (2009, 2012) and Bloom et al. (2013) as
well. The following proposition discusses the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium
with unemployment in every labor submarket.26
Proposition 7 When σ−1
σ
> γ, there exists a unique equilibrium with unemployment in
every labor submarket, if the labor endowment (i.e., L) is small enough; When σ−1
σ
< γ,
25The equilibrium condition stated in equation (25) has used the FE condition described above. Ex post
profit per active firm must compensate both the cost of exerting effort and the forgone outside option.
The overall forgone utility is f2
(
θ¯
θmin
)k
M , and total utility cost of exerting effort is ψM . Therefore,
profit per active firm that compensates these costs is ψ + f2
(
θ¯
θmin
)k
.
26When the outside option of workers (i.e., ph) is not too small in equilibrium, the equilibrium has the
property that some labor submarkets have unemployment and the others don’t. In this case, firms that
would offer lower incentive-compatible wages in the absence of the outside option of workers are forced
to raise wages up to ph + ψ. I discuss this case in Appendix 9.6 and show that qualitative results of the
model in this case are the same as the ones we are going to derive in the paper.
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there exists a unique equilibrium with unemployment in every labor submarket if the labor
endowment is big enough.
Proof. See Appendix 9.3.8.
The labor endowment affects the outside option of workers through two channels.
First, a bigger labor endowment reduces workers’ wage in the homogeneous sector as a
result of the supply-side effect. Second, a bigger labor endowment increases total income
of the economy, which leads to a larger demand for labor and increases the wage in the
homogeneous sector. The relative strength of these two effects depends on parameter
values. When σ−1
σ
> γ, the demand-side effect dominates. Thus, a sufficiently small
labor endowment insures that the workers’ outside option is small enough in equilibrium,
which validates the existence of a unique equilibrium with unemployment in every labor
submarket and vice versa.27
Admittedly, the condition assuring the existence of a unique equilibrium with unem-
ployment in every labor submarket involves endogenous variables.28 This is because both
wages offered in the CES sector and the wage offered in the homogeneous sector cannot
be solved analytically. However, when I treat the number of layers as a continuous vari-
able a` la Keren and Levhari (1979) and Qian (1994), the condition can be stated using
exogenous parameters only. Readers are referred to Appendix 9.4 for more details.
Aggregate labor demand that takes into account the product-market-clearing con-
ditions either increases or decreases in ph. There are two countervailing effects on the
aggregate labor demand, when the workers’ outside option increases. On the one hand,
the homogeneous sector demands less labor when ph goes up, and the number of job
applicants that equalizes the expected payoff obtained from entering the two sectors goes
down due to the higher outside option. On the other hand, the higher expected wage
increases the total income of the economy, which makes both sectors demand more labor.
The relative strength of these two offsetting effects depends on parameter values. When
σ−1
σ
< γ, the first effect dominates and vice versa. σ−1
σ
= γ, the aggregate labor demand
does not respond to the change in ph. Thus, there is either no equilibrium or infinitely
many equilibria depending on values of other parameters in this knife edge case. Thanks
to the uniqueness of the equilibrium under restrictions on parameter values, I can analyze
how an improvement in MT affects various economic activities.
I close this section by discussing the role of the unemployment rate in this model.
Although the wage determination in the current model is similar to the one used in the
efficiency wage theory (e.g., Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)), the role of the unemployment
rate is different. In the efficiency wage theory, the aggregate unemployment rate feeds
back to the incentive-compatible wage in a dynamic setup, and unemployment is present
only when there exists an exogenous separation rate between firms and workers.29 In this
paper, unemployment (or being fired) still serves as a disciplinary device to incentivize
workers to exert effort. However, unemployment rates (more precisely, job-turn-down
27The wage determination in the CES sector features that buyers (i.e., firms) have all the bargaining
power when the wage contracts are offered. This implies that changes in labor endowment do not affect
incentive-compatible wages, as long as there is unemployment in the labor submarkets.
28The condition assuring the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium is that σ−1σ 6= γ and ph ≤
wmin(θ¯)−ψ, where wmin(θ¯) is the lowest wage among wages offered in the CES sector. This is a sufficient
and necessary condition for the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
29Remember that every agent is incentivized to work in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
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rates) across different labor submarkets are used to equalize the expected payoff obtained
from entering different labor submarkets. Essentially, the role of unemployment rate in
my model is the same as in Harris and Todaro (1970) and is similar to the role played
by the labor market tightness in the literature on competitive search (e.g., Moen (1997)
etc.).30
4 Management Technology, Institutional Quality, and
Firm-Level Outcomes
This section investigates how an improvement in MT affects firm characteristics as well
as welfare. Ample evidence suggests that there are substantial differences in the quality
of MT across countries due to factors that are beyond the control of firms. Furthermore,
Hsieh and Klenow (2009, 2012) showed that China and India whose firms receive low
management scores have more firms of a small size and fewer efficient firms with large
market shares than the U.S. Finally, firm organization differs across countries due to
differences in MT and affects firm size and performance as well. More specifically, firms
in India are, compared with those in the U.S., less decentralized owing to worse MT and
weak enforcement of laws, and the low level of decentralization impedes Indian firms’
expansion (e.g., Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012a), Bloom et al. (2013)). The
purpose of this section is to show that there is a link between the quality of MT and the
firm characteristics discussed above.
4.1 Selection Effect of Better Management Technology
I consider a scenario in which the MT that is common across all firms improves. Such an
improvement is equivalent to a decrease in b in the model, since it becomes easier for the
firm to catch and fire shirking workers after the change. As a result, firms’ labor costs
decrease, since workers’ wages are determined by the incentive compatibility constraint.
An improvement in MT generates a pro-competitive effect that reallocates resources
toward more efficient firms. This improvement favors more efficient firms, since they have
more layers. More specifically, an improvement in MT benefits all firms since it reduces
firms’ labor cost. Moreover, firms with more layers gain disproportionately more, as their
AVCs increase less rapidly with output. More precisely, the AVC functions of firms with
more layers have smaller elasticities with respect to output. As a result, firms with the
worst demand draws are forced to leave the market; firms whose demand draws are in
the middle receive shrinking revenue and profit; and firms with the best demand draws
expand. In other words, an improvement in MT facilitates inter-firm resource allocation
30More specifically, the difference in the role of unemployment rate between the efficiency wage theory
and my model comes from the assumption of how the firm punishes misbehaving workers. In my static
model, the firm punishes shirking workers whose misbehavior has been detected by firing them and
reducing the wage payments. In the efficiency wage theory, the firm punishes shirking workers whose
misbehavior has been detected by firing them but not reducing the wage payments. Thus, the incentive
to work comes from a decrease in future income due to unemployment in the efficiency wage theory. It
is probably true that workers do get wage cuts when their performance does not meet some goals that
have been preset in practice.
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through benefitting bigger firms more, which is exactly what Bloom et al. (2013) argued
in their paper.
Endogenous selection of a management hierarchy with a specific number of layers is
the key to understanding the selection effect of an improvement in MT. In a hypothetical
world, if all firms were forced to have the same number of layers, the uneven effect would
disappear. This is because all firms would have the same AVC function in such a world.
As a result, the exit cutoff for the demand draw would be unaffected by an improvement
in MT. Furthermore, firms’ revenue and profit would be unchanged as well. In short, the
pro-competitive effect (i.e., the selection effect) is present only when firms endogenously
choose to have different numbers of layers.
How does the internal organization of firms evolve when MT improves? Bloom et al.
(2013) found that Indian firms are unwilling to decentralize their production processes
(i.e., constrained span of control), because it is hard to catch and punish misbehaving em-
ployees in India. Furthermore, they argued that poor monitoring and weak enforcement
of laws are reasons for why Indian firms can’t catch and punish misbehaving workers
easily. Finally, they argued that low level of decentralization is one reason for why Indian
firms are small on average. My model gives economic reasons rationalizing these findings.
First, when firms are able to monitor their employees more easily, the span of control
increases. Second, and more importantly, the number of layers also increases weakly for
each firm because of better monitoring. Firms expand when monitoring becomes more ef-
fective, and the expansion incentivizes firms to have more layers.31 As a result, firms have
fewer layers or constrained span of control in economies with worse MT. Furthermore,
less decentralized production processes are associated with smaller average firm size as
shown below. In total, firms are less decentralized in economies with poor MT, and the
low level of decentralization is one reason for why firms are small in these economies.
The predictions on the internal structure of firms are unique predictions of my model.
In knowledge-based hierarchy models (e.g., Garicano (2000)), an improvement in ICT
flattens firms’ hierarchies. That is, firms de-layer when ICT improves (See Garicano and
Van Zandt (2012) for details). The intuition is that the impact of an improvement in
ICT is heterogeneous across layers conditional on output. When communication becomes
more efficient, firms increase the knowledge learned by workers at upper layers and reduce
the knowledge learned by workers at lower layers. Furthermore, the number of layers is
reduced as well. When the costs of learning knowledge become cheaper, firms increase the
knowledge learned by workers at all layers and decrease the number of layers. However,
an improvement in MT does not have such a heterogeneous effect across layers in this
paper, since monitoring is done layer by layer. In other words, two non-adjacent layers
do not interact with each other in the management hierarchy considered in this paper.
Therefore, better MT affects different layers evenly. As a result, firm size (i.e., output or
employment) is a sufficient statistic to determine the optimal number of layers.
In order to derive analytical results on the firm size distribution and the distribution
of the number of layers, I assume that θ follows a Pareto distribution with a coefficient
k, or
G(θ) = 1−
(θmin
θ
)k
, (32)
31Note that output and employment go up for all firms. However, revenue and operating profit fall
for small firms after MT improves.
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where G(θ) is the CDF of the demand draw θ. The following proposition summarizes
the changes in firm characteristics due to an improvement in MT. Note that the above
distributional assumption is only needed for the results on the firm size distribution and
the distribution of the number of layers.
Proposition 8 Suppose management technology that is common across all firms im-
proves. Consider the case in which the minimum number of layers among active firms is
unchanged. For the economy as a whole, the exit cutoff for the quality draw increases. At
the firm level, all surviving firms either increase the number of layers (weakly) or make
the span of control bigger and keep the number of layers unchanged. Finally, if the quality
draw follows a Pareto distribution, both the firm size distribution and the distribution of
the number of layers move to the right in the First-Order-Stochastic-Dominance (FOSD)
sense.
Proof: See Appendix 9.3.9.
I focus on the case in which the minimum number of layers of active firms is unchanged
when MT improves, although similar results emerge in the other cases. The reason why
I focus on this case is that there are always some extremely small firms that have only
two layers (i.e., T = 1) in every economy of the world. Therefore, the case considered
in the paper is empirically more relevant. Furthermore, I prove that all the results of
Proposition 8 except for the prediction on the span of control hold, when the number
of layers is treated as a continuous variable a` la Keren and Levhari (1979) and Qian
(1994).32 In total, the aggregate-level predictions (i.e., changes in the exit cutoff, the
firm size distribution, and the number of layers) derived in the case of a continuous
number of layers are qualitatively the same as those derived in the case of a discrete
number of layers.
The FOSD results have important implications for resource allocation in the economy
and are consistent with the data. First, the FOSD result for the firm size distribution
implies that there are fewer small firms in economies with superior MT. Furthermore,
firms with better demand draws have bigger sales, and average firm size is bigger in such
economies as well. These theoretical predictions show the key role played an improvement
in MT in determining resource allocation. That is, resources are reallocated toward
more efficient firms. Second, the FOSD result for the distribution of the number of
layers implies that firms are less decentralized in economies with worse MT, which is one
important reason for why efficient firms don’t have large enough market shares in such
economies. Finally, these theoretical predictions are consistent with several key findings
and conjectures of a number of recent papers. For instance, Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
showed that India and China are worse at getting efficient firms to obtain big market
shares compared with the U.S. Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012b) found that a
given amount of increase in the management score has a bigger positive impact on firm
size in the U.S. than in other countries. As management scores are highly correlated with
firm productivity, this implies that more productive firms gain more in economies with
better MT such as in the U.S. This finding is exactly the key prediction of my model.
Next, Hsieh and Olken (2014) argued that it is the big firms that are constrained more
32The span of control is a constant which is not affected by the quality of MT and the demand draw
in the continuous case. Readers are referred to the Appendix 9.4 for details.
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Figure 6: Gains in Aggregate Productivity
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in developing countries, not the small firms. This conjecture is also consistent with the
key result of this paper. In short, the key results of the model seem to square well with
existing evidence.
Other than changes in the firm size distribution and the internal organization of firms,
the weighted average of firm productivity also increases as a result of an improvement in
MT. The weighted average of firm productivity is defined as the sum of the product of
firm productivity and its market share across all firms.33 Gains in the weighted average
of firm productivity come from three sources. First, firms with the worst demand draws
which are less productive on average exit the market after an improvement in MT (i.e., the
between-firm effect). Second, market shares of more productive firms increase, because
improved MT favors more productive firms. This makes the weighted average of firm
productivity increase as well (i.e., the between-firm effect). Finally, the productivity
of all surviving firms increases, as improved MT reduces firms’ costs (i.e., the within-
firm effect). In total, these three effects together increase the weighted average of firm
productivity, as shown in Figure 6.
Other than firm-level outcomes, I am also interested in how improved MT affects the
worker’s welfare. As workers can freely move between two sectors, the expected payoff
obtained from entering the CES sector must equal the wage offered in the homogeneous
sector. Therefore, the worker’s expected payoff obtained from entering the CES sector is
33The market share is either the firm’s share in the sector’s total output or its share in the sector’s
total sales.
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a sufficient statistic to evaluate welfare. In what follows, I discuss how this changes when
MT improves.
Better MT can either increase or decrease welfare due to multiple frictions in the
model. First, there is a moral hazard problem inside the firm due to information frictions.
Second, there is monopolistic distortion in one of the two sectors of this economy. Finally,
there is a labor market friction due to random search. As a result, unemployment exists
in labor submarkets. Therefore, a reduction in one friction does not necessarily increase
welfare. It turns out that the factor governing the direction of the change in welfare
is the elasticity of substitution between products in the CES sector, since it determines
whether or not the CES sector expands after an improvement in MT.
Workers in the CES sector face a trade-off between lower wages and higher probabil-
ities of being employed. When MT improves, employed workers receive lower wages and
payoffs (i.e., wages minus the disutility to exert effort) on average. However, firms expand
and demand more labor due to better MT.34 On top of that, the elasticity of substitution
determines the sensitivity of the firm’s expansion (i.e., the increase in average employ-
ment) with respect to an improvement in MT. When products are more substitutable,
this sensitivity is higher. Thus, the increase in employment per firm is bigger. Moreover,
the bigger increase in average employment eventually increases the aggregate income of
the economy which makes the market size bigger. As a result, the CES sector accommo-
dates more firms, and its aggregate labor demand increases. This increase reduces the
risk of being unemployed for workers in the CES sector. In summary, the increase in the
average probability of being employed dominates wage loss, when MT improves and the
elasticity of substitution is high. As a result, the worker’s expected payoff obtained from
entering the CES sector increases.
The opposite story happens when the elasticity of substitution is low. In this case,
the increase in employment per firm is small when MT improves. This small increase
in employment per firm and the decrease in the average wage eventually push down the
aggregate income of the economy, which makes the market size smaller. As a result,
the CES sector accommodates fewer firms and its aggregate labor demand decreases.
Therefore, workers obtain a lower expected payoff by entering the CES sector, as both
the average wage and the average employment rate in the CES sector decrease when
the elasticity of substitution is lower. Note that although firms with the worst demand
draws are driven out of the market when the MT improves, the ideal price index for the
CES sector increases. This is because the decrease in the mass of firms dominates the
decrease in the average price charged by active firms. In total, welfare decreases when
the elasticity of substitution is sufficiently small.
The above discussions on welfare are not analytical results, although simulation results
do show that welfare can either increase or decrease after an improvement in MT. Table 1
presents an example in which welfare increases when MT improves, while Table 2 shows
an example in which welfare decreases when MT improves. Importantly, when the number
of layers is treated as a continuous variable, welfare increases after an improvement in
MT if and only if σ−1
σ
> γ. This qualitative result is shown in Appendix 9.4.
34Remember that average firm size in terms of employment increases when MT improves.
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Table 1: Change in Welfare when MT Improves and σ is Big
Welfare Ave(wage) Ave(ur) M E
b=1.6 0.29 0.96 0.56 1.02 25.66
b=1.5 0.35 0.90 0.42 1.15 31.33
ur: unemployment rate; M: the mass of active firms; E: total income
σ = 3.8, γ = 0.6, ψ = 0.3
Table 2: Change in Welfare when MT Improves and σ is Small
Welfare Ave(wage) Ave(ur) M E
b=1.6 0.38 0.95 0.41 2.61 53.49
b=1.5 0.29 0.90 0.51 1.90 41.07
ur: unemployment rate; M: the mass of active firms; E: total income
σ = 2.8, γ = 0.75, ψ = 0.3
5 Trade Liberalization and Firm Organization
In this section, I extend the baseline model into the international context by considering
two symmetric countries. My analysis of opening up to trade in the symmetric two-
country case follows Melitz (2003). I make the standard assumption that there is a fixed
trade cost denoted by fx and a variable trade cost denoted by τ(≥ 1) for firms in the
CES sector to export. Similar to the fixed production cost, the fixed trade cost is also
paid in the form of the final composite good defined in equation 3. The variable trade
cost implies that if τ units of output are shipped to the foreign country, only one unit
arrives. Furthermore, it is assumed that the fixed trade cost is big enough such that
there is selection into exporting in the CES sector. The homogeneous good is not traded
regardless of the trade costs, because the two countries are symmetric.
This section focuses on how firms respond to trade liberalization. The analysis is
motivated in part by recent empirical evidence on how the internal organization of firms
evolves after bilateral trade liberalization. Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) showed that
after the enactment of the NAFTA, American firms in sectors with larger reductions in
import tariffs flattened their hierarchies. They did so by reducing the number of layers
between the chief executive officer (CEO) and division managers and increasing the span
of control of the CEO. Furthermore, division managers received more incentive-based
pay after the CEO increased the span of control. The extended model presented in this
section rationalizes these findings.
In a world of two countries, the firm in the CES sector allocates output between the
two markets to equalize its marginal revenues. The optimal allocation of output in the
domestic market is
qd =
q
(
AH
AF
τβ
)σ
1 +
(
AH
AF
τβ
)σ , (33)
where q is the total output, and AH and AF (= AH) are the adjusted market sizes of the
domestic market and the foreign market respectively. For non-exporters, the adjusted
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market size is AH . For exporters, the adjusted market size is(
1 +
1
τσ−1
) 1
σ
A, (34)
where A ≡ AH = AF .
The equilibrium conditions in the open economy are similar to those derived in the
closed economy. First, the product-market-equilibrium conditions now involve four equa-
tions. The equilibrium condition that pins down the cutoff for exporting (i.e., θ¯x) is
Π(θ¯x, (1 +
1
τσ−1
)
1
σA)− Π(θ¯x, A) = fx. (35)
Note that the cutoff for exporting cannot be solved analytically, since the average cost is
endogenously determined and depends on the number of layers the firm has. Next, the
FE condition now becomes∫ θ¯x
θ¯
Π(θ, A)g(θ)dθ +
∫ ∞
θ¯x
Π(θ, (1 +
1
τσ−1
)
1
σA)g(θ)dθ = fe, (36)
since non-exporters and exporters face different adjusted market sizes. And, the ZCP
condition is the same as in the closed economy, or
Π(θ¯, A) = 0. (37)
Finally, the market-clearing condition for the homogeneous sector is still given by
phLh = (1− γ)E. (38)
Second, the equilibrium conditions for the labor markets are similar to those derived
in the closed economy except that labor demand now contains two parts now: one from
non-exporting firms and the other one from exporting firms. More specifically, the number
of workers who choose to enter the CES sector (i.e., Lc) can be derived from the workers’
indifference condition, or
Lc =
∫ ∞
θ=θ¯
T (θ,A)∑
i=1
Q(θ, i)
Mg(θ)
1−G(θ¯)dθ
=
WP (θ¯, A,M)− ψLD(θ¯, A,M)
ph
, (39)
where WP (θ¯, A,M) is the total wage payment in the CES sector, and LD(θ¯, A,M) is
the number of workers employed in the CES sector, or
LD =
∫ ∞
θ=θ¯
T (θ,A)∑
i=1
m(θ, i)
Mg(θ)
1−G(θ¯)dθ.
Note that Lc and LD now consist of two parts and are affected by the trade costs (i.e., τ
and fx). Next, the labor-market-clearing condition indicates that the number of workers
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employed in the homogeneous sector is the difference between the labor endowment and
the number of workers who choose to enter the CES sector, or
Lh = L− Lc. (40)
Finally, the market-clearing condition of the final composite good is modified to
E =
∫ θ¯x
θ¯
LC(θ, A)
Mg(θ)
1−G(θ¯)dθ +
∫ ∞
θ¯x
LC(θ, (1 +
1
τσ−1
)
1
σA)
Mg(θ)
1−G(θ¯)dθ[
f0 + fx
( θ¯
θ¯x
)k
+ fe
( θ¯
θmin
)k]
M + ψM, (41)
since exporting firms use the final composite good to pay the fixed trade cost and face a
different market size than exporters. The equilibrium in the open economy is character-
ized by seven equations (i.e., equations (35) to (41)) and seven endogenous variables (i.e.,
θ¯, θ¯x, M , ph, Lc, Lh and E). It is easy to prove that there exists a unique equilibrium
under restrictions on parameter values using the same approach as the one used in the
closed economy. I omit the proof to save space.
I analyze how the opening up of trade affects the internal organization of firms. The
key to understanding why the the opening up of trade brings about a differential impact
on non-exporters and exporters is the difference in the change of the adjusted market
size. The following lemma shows that the adjusted market size shrinks for non-exporters
and increases for exporters.
Lemma 2 When the economy opens up to trade, the adjusted market size faced by non-
exporters shrinks, while the adjusted market size faced by exporters increases. Further-
more, the exit cutoff for the quality draw increases.
Proof: See Appendix 9.3.10.
With Lemma 2 in hand, I can analyze how the internal organization of firms and firm
productivity change when the economy moves from autarky to the open economy. The
main result is that non-exporters flatten their hierarchies by reducing the number of lay-
ers and increasing the span of control at existing layers, while exporting firms increase
the number of layers and reduce the span of control at all existing layers. The following
proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 9 When the economy opens up to trade, non-exporting firms reduce firm
size, while exporting firms increase firm size. Non-exporting firms de-layer weakly and
increase the span of control at existing layers when the number of layers is reduced.
Exporting firms increase the number of layers weakly and reduce the span of control at
existing layers when a new layer is added. Non-exporters increase the amount of incentive-
based pay when they de-layer.
Proof: See Appendix 9.3.11.
The effect of bilateral trade liberalization on the internal organization of firms is
heterogeneous and depends on the situation firms face. In the theory, non-exporting firms
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reduce the number of layers and increase the span of control at existing layers due to the
shrinking market size after bilateral trade liberalization. This is what Guadalupe and
Wulf (2010) found for American firms in industries with increasing import competition.
Furthermore, according to the theory, firms increase the incentive-based pay owning to
the increasing span of control. This is another finding from Guadalupe and Wulf (2010).
Of course, the theory also predicts that firms with increasing opportunities to export
(weakly) increase their number of layers and reduce the span of control after bilateral
trade liberalization. Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) did find that American firms in sectors
with larger reductions in Canadian import tariffs increased the number of layers and
reduced the span of control, although these results are not statistically significant. In
summary, firms facing different changes in the adjusted market size change their internal
organization differently after bilateral trade liberalization.
6 Management Quality and Aggregate Trade Vari-
ables
In this section, I investigate how management quality affects the trade share and the
WGT. I treat the number of layers as a continuous variable a` la Keren and Levhari
(1979) and Qian (1994) in order to derive analytical results in this section.35 As I have
shown before, the qualitative results of the model at the aggregate-level are unchanged,
if the number of layers is treated as a continuous variable instead of a discrete variable.
I derive three main results. First, the WGT are not guaranteed due to the existence of
multiple frictions in the economy. Second, the trade share is shown to be bigger between
economies with better MT. Third, I show that under certain conditions, WGT do exist,
and economies with superior MT benefit disproportionately from the opening of trade.
Finally, I relate my result to the ACR formula and argue that information on micro-level
variables which are related to the management quality is needed for the evaluation of the
WGT. In particular, the two aggregate trade statistics that appear in the ACR formula
are not enough for us to calculate the WGT.
I state several analytical results here, and readers are referred to Appendix 9.5 for
details. First, the relationship between the exporting cutoff and the exit cutoff is
θ¯x = θ¯
fxτ
σ−1
(f − ge) , (42)
where g ≡ bψ and e = 2.71828 is Euler’s number. Second, the domestic consumption
share and the import share of the CES goods are
λ(τ, b) =
τσ−1
(
θ¯x
θ¯
)k−1
1 + τσ−1
(
θ¯x
θ¯
)k−1 (43)
and
1− λ(τ, b) = 1
1 + τσ−1
(
θ¯x
θ¯
)k−1 (44)
35The analysis in all other sections treats the number of layers as a discrete variable.
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respectively. Since θ¯x
θ¯
increases in b from equation (42), the better is the MT, the bigger
is the share of exporting firms. Furthermore, equation (44) shows that the better is the
MT, the larger is the trade share.36 In economies with better MT, the exit cutoff for the
demand draw is higher when these economies are in autarky as a result of the selection
effect. This leads to the result that active firms in these economies are bigger and more
productive when these economies are in autarky. Since it is the bigger firms that start
to export when the economies move from autarky to open economies, disproportionately
more firms export in economies with better MT.
Next, I discuss sufficient conditions under which the WGT exist and economic in-
terpretations of these conditions. Detailed proof can be found in Appendix 9.5. There
are two sets of conditions that assure the WGT, and two crucial parameters that deter-
mine the existence of the WGT are the management quality parameter (i.e., 1
b
) and the
elasticity of substitution (i.e., σ).
First, when the elasticity of substitution is big, there are WGT if the management
quality is high. When the iceberg trade cost goes down, it induces resource reallocation
between sectors. When the elasticity of substitution is high, resources are reallocated
from the homogeneous sector to the CES sector. There are two countervailing forces that
cause this result. First, average firm size in the CES sector increases due to a reduction in
the iceberg trade cost. Second, the mass of active firms in the CES sector decreases when
the iceberg trade cost goes down. The relative strength of these two forces depends on
the elasticity of substitution (and the relative size of the CES sector). When the elasticity
is high (i.e., smaller market power in the CES sector), the increase in average firm size
is bigger, and the decrease in the mass of active firms is smaller. Therefore, resources
are reallocated from the homogeneous sector to the CES sector after a reduction in the
iceberg trade cost. I.e., the monopolistically competitive sector expands as a result of the
trade liberalization. When the management quality of firms in the CES sector is high,
resources that are reallocated into the CES sector are used efficiently after the trade
shock, which ensures WGT.37
Second, when the elasticity of substitution is small, there are WGT if the management
quality of firms in the CES sector is low. The economic reasoning follows the same logic
that I have discussed above. Namely, the increase in average firm size is dominated by the
decrease in the mass of active firms in the CES sector, when the iceberg trade cost falls
and the elasticity of substitution is small. As a result, resources are reallocated from the
CES sector to the homogeneous sector after a reduction in the iceberg trade cost. When
the management quality of firms in the CES sector is low, resources that are reallocated
away from the CES sector are used inefficiently before the trade liberalization. Therefore,
there are WGT when these resources are reallocated to the homogeneous sector after the
trade shock. In summary, WGT are not guaranteed in a world with multiple frictions. In
particular, whether or not there are WGT crucially depends on whether or not resources
that are reallocated after the trade liberalization are used inefficiently before the trade
liberalization.
In Appendix 9.5, I show that under the first set of the above conditions, the comple-
mentarity result holds. Namely, the better is the MT, the larger are the WGT. I focus on
36Note that this result still holds if I define trade share as imports divided by the total income, since
expenditure on the CES goods is a constant fraction of the total income.
37Remember that there is no incentive problem for firms in the homogeneous sector.
35
this set of conditions, since the parameters of the calibrated model presented in Section
7 satisfy these conditions. In short, the WGT and the complementarity result are shown
to exist for counterfactual experiments that I am going to present in the next section.
Finally, I relate the formula for the WGT derived in this subsection to the formula
derived in Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2012) (henceforth, ACR formula). In
an influential paper, Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare showed that the WGT are
completely determined by two aggregate statistics in a number of canonical trade model
(e.g., Krugman (1980), Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Melitz (2003)). They are the share
of expenditure on domestic goods and the elasticity of trade with respect to variable trade
costs. In this subsection, I show that the model presented in this paper does not fall into
the set of models whose predictions for the WGT are completely characterized by the
above two statistics. Furthermore, I show that micro-level information which is related
to the management quality is needed for the evaluation of the WGT.
Among the two aggregate statistics appearing in the ACR formula, one statistic (i.e.,
the domestic consumption share) is derived in equation (43). The other one which is the
elasticity of the trade share with respect to the variable trade cost is calculated as
 ≡ ∂ln (1− λ(τ, b))/λ(τ, b)
∂ln τ
= −(σ − 1)k.
Note that this elasticity is constant in the case of the continuous number of layers and
does not depend on the management quality. However, it should be emphasized that this
result is valid, only when I treat the number of layers as a continuous variable.
Now, I evaluate the WGT. Calculation shows that the WGT are
WGT (b, τ) = λ(τ, b)
γ
k(γ−(1−γ)(σ−1))
[[
1 + (1−γ)σ
γ(σ−1)
be
(be−1)
]
xT (θ¯)− k−1k λ(τ, b)[
1 + (1−γ)σ
γ(σ−1)
be
(be−1)
]
xT (θ¯)− k−1k
] γ
γ−(1−γ)(σ−1)
, (45)
where xT (θ) is the output level of the smallest firms in equilibrium. It is evident from
equation (45) that information on the expenditure share on the CES goods (i.e., γ), the
management quality (i.e., 1
b
), and the output level of the smallest firms (i.e., xT (θ¯)) is
needed for the evaluation of the WGT. In an extreme case in which there is no outside
sector, the above equation is simplified to
WGT (b, τ) = λ(τ, b)
1
k
xT (θ¯)− k−1k λ(τ, b)
xT (θ¯)− k−1k
.
Even in this extreme case, information on three variables is still needed to evaluate the
welfare change from opening up to trade. A new variable that does not show up in the
ACR formula is the output level of the smallest firms in equilibrium.
In summary, in a world with information frictions which validate the use of manage-
ment hierarchies, evaluating the WGT requires more information than that contained in
the ACR formula. Of course, this does not mean that the ACR formula is incorrect, since
one restriction of the ACR formula that aggregate profit is a constant fraction of total
income is violated in my framework. The above result only shows that micro-level factors
such as the management quality should be taken into account, even if we only care about
changes in aggregate economic outcomes.
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7 Calibration
In this section, I calibrate the model in order to implement counterfactual experiments.
The counterfactual experiments show that an improvement in MT has quantitatively im-
portant effects on aggregate productivity, firm size and welfare. Furthermore, its impact
on the WGT is quantitatively sizable.
I choose to match six moments from the data in order to estimate six parameters:
bψ, k, fe, f , fx, and γ. The first four moments are moments that are not related to
international trade. They are the average employment of firms, the fraction of firms that
have less than ten employees, the fraction of firms that have more than five hundred
employees, and the Pareto shape parameter obtained from the regression of log rank on
log firm size (i.e., log employment).38 The other two moments are related to international
trade. They are the share of firms that export and the trade share (i.e., the average of
the export-GDP ratio and the import-GDP ratio).
I obtained values for the above moments from various sources. First, from the U.S.
economic census data, I obtained values of three moments. In 2007, an average U.S.
manufacturing firm employs 46.57 workers. There are 55.04% manufacturing firms that
have less than ten employees, and 1.03% manufacturing firms that have more than five
hundred employees in 2007. Second, the world bank database shows that the export-GDP
ratio and the import-GDP ratio are 12% and 16% for the U.S. in 2007 respectively. Thus,
the trade share for the U.S. is 14% in 2007. Bernard et al. (2007) estimated that 18%
of U.S. manufacturing firms exported in 2002.39 Finally, Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg
(2012) reported that the Pareto shape parameter for U.S. manufacturing firms is 1.095.
For details, see Table 3.
I obtained values of the other parameters from the literature. Following Bernard et
al. (2003) and Melitz and Redding (2013), I set the elasticity of substitution, σ, to 4.
Following Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), I set the labor endowment, L, to 16.48
million. Following Ghironi and Melitz (2005), I set the iceberg trade cost, τ , to 1.3.
I search over the parameter space for the parameter values that match the above
moments, using as a loss function the norm of the percentage deviation difference between
the model and the data.40 Estimated parameters are reported in Table 4. The estimation
of ψ uses the result from Hall (2006) that the disutility of working is 71% of average
labor productivity (i.e., output per worker). Since the estimated value of bψ is 0.649,
the implied ψ and b are 0.370 and 1.755 respectively. As an over-identification check,
I obtained values for two additional moments that are closely related to the internal
organization of firms to check whether the calibrated model does a good job at matching
these two moments as well. First, the U.S. economic census data shows that wage share of
production workers was 57.7% in 2007. As Table 5 shows, the calibrated model predicts
that this value is 52.1% which is close to the data.41 Second, Guadalupe and Wulf (2010)
38The Pareto shape for the firm size distribution is obtained from the regression of
ln(Pr(employment > x)) on ln(employment) = x, where Pr(employment > x) is the share of firms
that have employment more than x.
39No information is available for this moment in 2007.
40In other words, I use the identity matrix as the weighting matrix.
41Although non-production workers only monitor in my model, it is straightforward to extend the
model into the case in which non-production workers both monitor and exert effort to increase firm
productivity under certain assumptions. If I assume that monitoring requires only time and no effort as
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reported that the average number of managerial layers was 3.1−3.2 for various industries
in 1999 in a sample containing 230 large U.S. manufacturing firms.42 Although I use data
on the entire population of manufacturing firms in 2007, it is interesting to compare the
characteristics of firms in their sample relative to what my model yields. The calibrated
model predicts that the average number of managerial layers is 3.44 which is close to
what Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) have found. In summary, the difference between the
moments obtained from the data and the moments generated by the calibrated model is
small.
Table 3: Moments from the Data and the Model
Data Model
Pareto Shape Parameter 1.095 1.097
Employment per firm 46.57 46.57
Fraction of small firms (less than 10 employees) 55.04% 55.14%
Fraction of big firms (more than 500 employees) 1.03% 0.76%
Fraction of exporting firms 18% 17.84%
Trade Share (relative to GDP) 14% 14.00%
The Pareto shape parameter is obtained from the regression of log rank on log firm size.
Table 4: Parameter Values
Value Sources
σ 4 Bernard et al. (2003)
L 16.48 Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012)
τ 1.3 Ghironi and Melitz (2005)
f 4.98
fe 3.00
fx 4.84
k 1.188
bψ 0.649
γ 0.545
Table 5: Moments Related to Internal Firm Organization
Data Model
The number of managerial layers 3.1-3.2 3.44
Wage share of production workers 57.7% 52.1%
in Qian (1994), the extend model yields exactly the same firm-level outcomes and resource allocation as
the current model. Therefore, the value of this moment in the data is comparable to the value of this
moment generated by the model.
42The number of managerial layers is the number of layers ranging from the CEO to division managers
who supervise the lowest production units. In the model, it is measured as the number of layers ranging
from layer T − 1 to layer 0.
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I implement two counterfactual experiments to investigate the quantitative impact of
an improvement in MT on firm size, aggregate productivity and the WGT. The aver-
age score of Indian firms on monitoring and incentive practices is about 22% lower than
American firms in the World Management Survey (WMS). I consider a similar percentage
change in the management quality in the model. More specifically, I consider a compar-
ative statistics in which the value of b decreases from 2.141(= 1.755 ∗ 1.22) (India) to
1.755 (the US). Remember that the management quality is denoted by 1
b
. Thus, such
an improvement implies a 22% improvement in MT. The first quantitative exercise is to
evaluate how such an improvement affects firm size, productivity and welfare. Table 6
shows that average employment and sales increase by 72.2% and 36.9% as a result of this
improvement. Furthermore, weighted average firm productivity and welfare increase by
22.2% and 47.1% respectively. The second quantitative exercise is to evaluate how the
deterioration in MT affects the trade share and the WGT. Table 7 reports the result.
The improvement in MT yields a 1.21% increase in the WGT which is about 7.4% of
the WGT before the improvement. This improvement also generates a 5.31% increase
in the fraction of exporting firms. In total, the calibrated model is able to generate a
quantitatively sizable impact of an improvement in MT on firm size, productivity and
the WGT.
Table 6: Firm Size, Aggregate Productivity and Welfare
Prodw Employment Sales Welfare
M&I ↑ 22% 22.2% 72.2% 36.9% 47.1%
Prodw: percentage change in weighed average of firm productivity
Employment: percentage change in average employment
Sales: percentage change in average sales
Welfare: percentage change in welfare
Table 7: Trade Share and the Welfare Gains from Trade
b=2.141 b=1.755 Complementarity
WGT 16.42% 17.63% 1.21%
Share of exporting firms 12.53% 17.84% 5.31%
8 Conclusions
This paper uses one canonical approach to modeling the incentive problem inside the
firm and incorporates an incentive-based hierarchy into a general equilibrium framework
to show the pro-competitive effect of an improvement in MT. By investigating how the
quality of MT affects firm characteristics, this paper rationalizes several key findings in
the macro-development literature and the organizational economics literature. On top
of that, by extending the baseline model into the international context, I not only can
explain several findings related to changes in the organizational structure of firms after
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bilateral trade liberalization, but can also discuss how the quality of MT affects aggregate
trade variables such as the trade share and the WGT.
The main contribution of this paper is to explore the selection effect of a common
improvement in MT for firms. This effect is due to the heterogeneous impact of such
an improvement on firms with various efficiency levels. As a result of this selection
effect, resources are reallocated from small firms to big firms, which leads to systematic
changes in firm size, aggregate productivity, and welfare. It is for the first time in the
literature that these economic insights and implications are pointed out rigourously in
a general equilibrium framework. Furthermore, the channel through which the common
improvement in MT generates the selection effect is shown to be the endogenous formation
of the internal firm organization. These economic insights and implications open room
for future research on management practices and should be contrasted with the data.
Undoubtedly, much more research remains to be done. First, integrating the knowledge-
based hierarchy and the incentive-based hierarchy into a unified framework is an inter-
esting idea, since each approach reflects only one part of the function of the management
hierarchy. Second, investigating how the quality of MT affects firms’ organizational choice
(e.g., outsourcing or in-house production) is also an interesting topic to explore. Finally,
although MT considered in this chapter is exogenous and invariant across firms, recent
evidence suggests that MT does differ across firms and is affected by shocks such as
trade liberalization (Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) and Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen
(2012b)). Therefore, it is worth exploring how trade liberalization endogenously affects
MT which in turn impacts aggregate economic outcomes.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Empirical Motivation
In this subsection, I discuss the details of my empirical motivation. Three parts come
in order. First, I discuss the content of MT used in this paper. Next, I argue that
MT is highly correlated with firm performance by showing some motivating evidence.
Third, I show that quality of monitoring and incentives is an important part of the
overall management quality, and there is substantial heterogeneity on these management
practices across firms. Finally, I argue that the quality of MT differs across economies
and is systematically correlated with firm size distribution.
First, I discuss what MT used in this paper means. In Bloom and Van Reenen
(2010), eighteen management practices are grouped into three categories; monitoring,
targets and incentives. “Monitoring” refers to “how companies monitor what goes on
inside their firms and use this for continuous improvement”. “Targets” refers to “how
companies set the right targets, track the right outcomes, and take appropriate action
if the two are inconsistent”. “Incentives” refers to “how companies promote and reward
employees based on performance, and whether or not companies try to hire and keep
their best employees”. This paper focuses on the first type and a part of the third type
of management practices defined in Bloom and Van Reenen (2010).
I pick up seven management practices and argue that they are closely related to the
concept of MT used in this paper. Among the seven practices I pick up, the first four
items are “performance tracking”, “performance review”, “performance dialogue” and
“performance clarity”, which are related to whether or not firms can successfully find
and catch misbehaving employees. The other three items are “consequence management”,
“rewarding high performance”, “remove poor performers”, which are related to whether
or not the firm can credibly punish (and reward) shirking employees (and hard working
employees). I calculate the average score on these seven items and treat it as the measure
for the quality of MT. The average score on these seven items is defined as moinc.
Next, I show that the quality of MT is highly correlated with firm performance by
presenting simple scatter plots in Figure 7. As it is evident in the figure, the quality of
MT is positively associated with firm performance such as sales per employee or total
employment.
Third, I implement a variance and covariance decomposition exercise and show that
there is substantial heterogeneity for scores on monitoring and incentives across firms.
Note that the average management score is the sum of two parts or
msi = moinci + nonmoinci =
1
18
Σj∈moincScoreij +
1
18
Σj∈nonmoincScoreij,
where msi is the average management score for firm i, and j is the j−th management
practice. The set moinc (or nonmoinc) is the set of management practices that are (or
are not) related to monitoring and incentives. Next, I decompose the variation in the
average management score into the following three parts:
1
n
Σi(msi −ms)2 = 1
n
[
Σi(moinci −moinc)2 + Σi(nonmoinci − nonmoinc)2
+2Σi(moinci −moinc)(nonmoinci − nonmoinc)
]
,
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Figure 7: Management Quality and Firm Performance
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where m¯s = 1
n
Σimsi and n is the number of firms in the data set. The first and the second
terms above are the variations in management scores coming from moinc and nonmoinc
respectively. The last term reflects the correlation between these two scores across firms.
Table 8 shows that there is substantial variation in the score of moinc across firms.
Table 8: Management Score Decomposition
overall variation var(moinc) var(nonmoinc) cross term
Contributions 0.442 0.071 0.187 0.184
moinc: average score on monitoring and incentives.
nonmoinc: average score on other management practices.
crossterm: correlation between the above two scores across firms.
Finally, I show that quality of monitoring and incentives differs across countries and
is associated with firm size distribution. First, Table 9 shows that scores on every man-
agement practice that is included in the set of moinc differ significantly between China
and the U.S. Second, Figure 8 shows that the distribution of scores on moinc differs
substantially between India and the U.S.43 Average score on moinc is significantly higher
for U.S. firms. Finally, average management score on moinc is positively associated with
the average firm size in an economy as Figure 8 shows. In other words, U.S. firms that
have good MT are larger than Indian firms on average, and there are much more small
firms in India compared with the U.S.
Table 9: Difference in the Quality of Monitoring and Incentives between China and the
U.S.
Perf2 Perf3 Perf4 Perf10 Perf5 talent2 talent3
U.S. 3.65 3.63 3.58 2.93 3.67 3.17 3.82
China 2.99 3.09 2.74 2.77 2.65 2.88 3.04
Range for scores: 1− 5.
All differences in means are statistically significant at 1% level.
In total, evidence presented in this subsection explains why cross-country differences
in the management quality is a natural candidate to explain cross-country differences in
aggregate variables such as the size distribution of firms.
9.2 Continuous Effort Choice
In this subsection, I setup up the model under the assumption that workers’ effort choice
is a continuous variable. The goal of this exercise is to show that the model under this
alternative assumption is isomorphic to the model with a binary effort choice.
I discuss the wage determination under the alternative assumption for the effort choice.
Now, non-production workers’ effort choice ai (i ≤ T − 1) is a continuous variable with
an upper bound a¯. An increase in ai raises the probability of catching and firing a
43The upper graph uses data from the WMS. The lower graph comes from Hsieh and Klenow (2012).
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Figure 8: Management Quality and the Firm Size Distribution
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misbehaving worker even when the span of control is unchanged. Under this specification,
the worker’s incentive compatibility constraint is
wi − ψ(ai) ≥ (1− p(b, xi−1, ai−1))wi (46)
where p(b, xi, ai−1) = 1b
ai−1
xi−1
= 1
b
ai−1mi−1
mi
. Thus, the incentive compatible wage is
wi =
bψ(ai)mi
ai−1mi−1
. (47)
For reasons of tractability, I choose the following functional form for the cost function of
exerting effort:
ψ(a) =
ψ¯
a¯− a. (48)
The key feature of the above functional form is that disutility increases with the effort
level at an increasing speed (i.e., a convex function).
I show why a firm wants to incentivize workers at a given layer to choose the same level
of effort and allocates the monitoring intensity evenly across them. The basic logic is the
same as in the discrete case. The firm can always reduce the wage payment and induce
the same total amount of effort inputs by equalizing the effort level and the monitoring
intensity across workers at a given layer. Lemma 3 summarizes the results.
Lemma 3 The firm incentivizes workers at a given layer to choose the same level of
effort and equalizes the monitoring intensity across them.
Proof. I prove this lemma in three steps. For any two units of effort inputs at layer i and
the corresponding monitoring intensities for them, (i.e., ai1, pi1) and (ai2, pi2), there are
four possibilities of relationship between them in total.44 Namely, ai1 = ai2 and pi1 = pi2;
ai1 = ai2 and pi1 6= pi2; ai1 6= ai2 and pi1 = pi2; ai1 6= ai2 and pi1 6= pi2. I prove that the
last three possibilities are not optimal in what follows.
First, for the case in which ai1 = ai2 and pi1 6= pi2, I can use exactly the same approach
used in the discrete case to prove that it is not optimal. Second, I discuss the case in
which ai1 6= ai2 and pi1 = pi2. Total wage payment that is used to induce effort levels ai1
and ai2 can be reduced, if the effort levels are equalized. Formally, it must be true that
b
ψ(ai1+ai2
2
)
pi1
+ b
ψ(ai1+ai2
2
)
pi2
< b
ψ(ai1)
pi1
+ b
ψ(ai2)
pi2
,
as ψ(a) is a convex function. Finally, for the case in which ai1 6= ai2 and pi1 6= pi2, let me
make the following simplifying notations:
a0 ≡ ai1 + ai2
and
p0 ≡ pi1 + pi2.
44The monitoring intensity is defined as pi ≡ ai−1mi−1mi .
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Cost minimization requires that allocation of two units of effort inputs and the monitoring
intensities given (a0, p0) are optimal at (ai1, pi1) and (ai2, pi2). Thus, we must have
ψ
′
(ai1)
pi1
=
ψ
′
(ai2)
pi2
and
ψ(ai1)
p2i1
=
ψ(ai2)
p2i2
due to the FOCs with respect to ai1 and pi1. The above two equations lead to the result
that
ai1 = ai2 =
a0
2
and
pi1 = pi2 =
p0
2
which contradicts that ai1 6= ai2 and pi1 6= pi2. Therefore, the cost structure that is consis-
tent with the firm’s cost minimization is the case in which ai1 = ai2 and pi1 = pi2 for any
two units of effort inputs. In other words, the firm incentivizes workers at a given layer
to choose the same level of efforts and equalizes the monitoring intensities on them. QED.
I can characterize the firm’s optimization problem now. Based on equation (47) and
Lemma 3, the firm’s optimization problem can be written as
max{ai,mi}i=1,...,T ,N,T A(θ)
1
σ q
σ−1
σ −
T∑
i=1
bψ(ai)
m2i
ai−1mi−1
(49)
s.t. xi =
mi
mi−1
,
x0 = 1; a0 = 1; mT = N =
q
aT
; m0 = 1;
0 ≤ ai ≤ a¯.
As in the discrete case, I minimize the firm’s variable cost given an output level first and
then solve for the optimal output level as well as the optimal number of layers.
First, the variable cost for a firm that produces q units of output and has T + 1 layers
is
min
{ai,mi}i=1,...,T
T∑
i=1
bψ(ai)
m2i
ai−1mi−1
, (50)
where mT = q/aT . The FOC of equation (50) with respect to mi is
2miψ(ai)
ai−1mi−1
− ψ(ai+1)m
2
i+1
aim2i
= 0. (51)
The FOC of equation (50) with respect to ai is
m2iψ
′
(ai)
ai−1mi−1
− ψ(ai+1)m
2
i+1
a2imi
= 0. (52)
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Note that the second order conditions hold for both ai and mi. By comparing equation
(51) with equation (52), I have
2ψ(ai)
miψ
′(ai)
=
ai
mi
or
ψ
′
(ai)ai
ψ(ai)
= 2.
Due to the functional form of ψ(a) given in equation (48), the optimal effort level ai
(i < T ) is
a∗i =
2a¯
3
. (53)
Without loss of generality, I normalize a¯ to 3
2
which leads to
a∗i = 1
for all i < T . Thus, the total wage payment given q and T is
min
aT ,{mi}i=1,...,T
T−1∑
i=1
bψ(1)
m2i
mi−1
+ bψ(aT )
( q
aT
)2
mT−1
, (54)
from which I solve for optimal aT . Using the FOC of equation (54) with respect to aT , I
derive that
ψ
′
(aT )aT
ψ(aT )
= 2 (55)
and
a∗T =
2a¯
3
= 1.
In total, the optimal effort choice is one for all workers, which is the same as in the
discrete case.45
Second, the FOCs of equation (50) with respect to various mi’s can be rewritten as
wTmT = 2wT−1mT−1 = ... = 2T−1w1m1,
which are the same as the ones derived in the discrete case. Therefore, I obtain the same
solution for optimal employment at layer i as in the discrete case or
mi(N, T ) = 2
i
(N
2T
) 2T−2T−i
2T−1
. (56)
Third, I derive optimal output and operating profit for firms with the quality draw θ
from equation (49). The solutions are
q(θ, T ) = N(θ, T ) =
[
Aβθ
1
σ
bψ2
2− T
2T−1
] σ(2T−1)
σ+(2T−1)
(57)
45The key equations here are equations (52) and (55). The key feature of them is that the optimal
effort choice is completely determined by the cost function to exert effort. Thus, neither firm-level
characteristics nor market-level variables are needed when we derive it.
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and
pi(θ, T ) = (1− β(2
T − 1)
2T
)(Aθ
1
σ )
2T σ
σ+(2T−1)
(
β/b(
2
2T+1−2−T
2T−1
))
(σ−1)(2T−1)
σ+(2T−1)
, (58)
These two solutions are exactly the same as the ones derived in the discrete case.
Finally, the firm chooses the number of layers optimally. The proofs and results in
the discrete case all apply here, since the cost structure derived in the continuous case
is exactly the same as the one derived in the discrete case. Furthermore, all empirical
predictions and propositions derived in the discrete case hold in the continuous case as
well.
9.3 Proof
9.3.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. First, suppose that there is a worker at layer i who shirks in equilibrium (i.e.,
ai = 0). If he is a production worker, removing him from the hierarchy does not affect
the firm’s output and (weakly) reduces labor cost. If he is a non-production worker, his
direct subordinates at layer i + 1 would shirk as a result of the absence of monitoring
from above. Furthermore, all his direct and indirect subordinates would shirk as well.
Similar as before, removing them from the hierarchy does not affect the firm’s output and
(weakly) reduces the labor costs, which means excluding them from the hierarchy is always
optimal. Thus, all workers are incentivized to work in equilibrium. Second, the reason
why the firm wants to allocate the monitoring intensities evenly across workers is that it
could reduce wage payments by doing so, if the monitoring intensities were not equalized.
More specifically, suppose there are two units of effort inputs that are monitored under
different monitoring intensities p1 and p2. As all workers are incentivized to work, the
wage payment to these two units equals
bψ
( 1
p1
+
1
p2
)
.
However, the firm can reduce this wage payment by equalizing the monitoring intensities
across these two units of effort inputs as
2bψ
1
(p1 + p2)/2
< bψ
( 1
p1
+
1
p2
)
for any p1 6= p2. This means that the firm can elicit the two units of effort inputs under a
lower cost. Therefore, the firm’s optimal choice is to equalize the monitoring intensities
across workers at a given layers. QED.
9.3.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The AVC function and the MC function given the number of layers are
AV C(q, T ) = (2− 1
2T−1
)bψ21−
T
2T−1 q
1
2T−1 (59)
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and
MC(q, T ) = bψ22−
T
2T−1 q
1
2T−1 =
2T
2T − 1AV C(q, T ). (60)
From the expression of these two cost functions, it is straightforward to see that both of
them increase with output q given the number of layers T + 1. Thus, the first part of the
proposition has been proved.
Next, I discuss the overall shape of the AVC curve. Before the discussion, let me make
the following notation for future use.
Definition 1 Let qT be the solution to the following equation:
AV C(qT , T ) = AV C(qT , T + 1).
In other words, the AVC of using T + 1 layers is equal to the AVC of using T + 2 layers
at output level qT .
Now, I prove the following lemma which assures the monotonicity of qT .
Lemma 4 qT increases in T .
Proof. I rewrite AV C(qT , T ) = AV C(qT , T + 1) as
(2− 1
2T−1 )/2
T
2T−1
(2− 1
2(T+1)−1 )/2
(T+1)
2(T+1)−1
q
1
2T−1−
1
2(T+1)−1
T = 1.
Thus, the switching point qT can be rewritten as
qT =
[2T+1 − 1
2T+1 − 2
] (2T−1)(2T+1−1)
2T
2(T−1)+
1
2T ≡ Ψ1(T )Ψ2(T ).
Taking logs and calculating the first order derivative with respect to T yields the following
result:
d[ln(Ψ1(T )) + ln(Ψ2(T ))]
dT
= ln 2(2T+1 − 2−T ) ln
(2T+1 − 1
2T+1 − 2
)
− ln 2 + ln 2
[
1− ln 2
2T
]
.
Thus, the sign of the above expression depends on
Sign
(d[ln(Ψ1(T )) + ln(Ψ2(T ))]
dT
)
= Sign
(
(22T+1 − 1) ln(2
T+1 − 1
2T+1 − 2)− ln 2
)
or
Sign
(d[ln(Ψ1(T )) + ln(Ψ2(T ))]
dT
)
= Sign
(
(22T+1 − 1) ln(2
T+1 − 1
2T − 1 )− 2
2T+1 ln 2
)
or
Sign
(d[ln(Ψ1(T )) + ln(Ψ2(T ))]
dT
)
= Sign
(
(1− 2−(2T+1)) ln(2
T+1 − 1
2T − 1 )− ln 2
)
.
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I want to show that (1−2−(2T+1)) ln(2T+1−1
2T−1 )− ln 2 decreases in T for T ≥ 1. First, I have
d
[
(1− 2−(2T+1)) ln(2T+1−1
2T−1 )− ln 2
]
dT
= ln 2
[
ln(
2T+1 − 1
2T − 1 )
1
22T
− (1− 1
22T+1
) 1
2T+1 − 3 + 1
2T
]
≡ ln 2(K1(T )−K2(T )).
Second, I prove that
K1(T )−K2(T ) < 0
for all T ≥ 1. I proceed in two steps. In the first step, calculation shows that K1(1) −
K2(1) < 0. In the second step, it is straightforward to see that for any T > 1
K1(T ) <
1
22(T−1)
K1(1)
and
K2(T ) >
1
2T−1
K2(1).
Thus, I have
K1(T )−K2(T ) < K1(1)−K2(1) < 0
for all T > 1. Finally, due to the monotonicity of (1 − 2−(2T+1)) ln(2T+1−1
2T−1 ) − ln 2 with
respect to T that has just been proven, I conclude that
(1− 2−(2T+1)) ln(2
T+1 − 1
2T − 1 )− ln 2 > limT→∞(1− 2
−(2T+1)) ln(
2T+1 − 1
2T − 1 )− ln 2 = 0.
and
Sign
(d[ln(Ψ1(T )) + ln(Ψ2(T ))]
dT
)
= Sign
(
(1− 2−(2T+1)) ln(2
T+1 − 1
2T − 1 )− ln 2
)
> 0.
Therefore, qT must be an increasing function of T . QED.
Having established the monotonicity of qT in Lemma 4, I can characterize the overall
shape of the AVC curve.
Lemma 5 If the output produced in equilibrium q ∈ [qT−1, qT ), the optimal number of
hierarchical layers is T + 1. At the output level qT , the AVC curve kinks and its slope
decreases discontinuously as the firms adds a layer. Finally, the switching point qT does
not depend on the firm’s quality draw (i.e., θ), the inefficiency of MT (i.e., b) and the
adjusted market size (i.e., A).
Proof. I proceed the proof in the following several steps. First, note that at qT−1,
the slope of AV C(q, T ) is smaller than the slope of AV C(q, T − 1) as AV C(qT−1, T ) =
AV C(qT−1, T − 1). This prove the second part of this lemma. Second, due to this
property, AV C(q, T − 1) is below AV C(q, T ) for q < qT−1 and above AV C(q, T ) for
q > qT−1. Thus, T + 1 layers is never chosen for q < qT−1. Similarly, T + 1 layers is never
chosen for q > qT as AV C(q, T ) is above AV C(q, T + 1) for q > qT . Third, as AV C(q, T )
is below AV C(q, T−1) for q > qT−1 and qT increases in T , AV C(q, T ) is below AV C(q, t)
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for all t < T when q > qT−1. Similarly, as AV C(q, T + 1) is above AV C(q, T ) for q < qT
and qT increases in T , AV C(q, t) is above AV C(q, T ) for all t > T when q < qT . In total,
AV C(q, T ) is below AV C(q, t) for all t 6= T when q ∈ (qT−1, qT ) which leads to the result
that for q ∈ (qT−1, qT ), the optimal choice of layers is T + 1. Of course, when q = qT−1,
choosing either T layers or T + 1 layers is optimal. Finally, the third half of the above
lemma follows from the expression of qT directly. QED.
I prove the following claim that characterizes the overall shape of the MC curve.
Claim 1 Given the number of layers T +1, the MC increases with output. The final MC
curve is
MC(q) = MC(q, T )
where q ∈ [qT−1, qT ). This cost increases in interval [qT−1, qT ) for all T and decreases
discontinuously at the point qT .
Proof. It is straightforward to see the first part of this proposition due to Lemma 5.
The only thing that needs proof is the last part. First, it is straightforward to see that
MC(q, T ) increases in q for a given T . Second, at qT , I have
AV C(qT , T ) = AV C(qT , T + 1).
As
MC(q, T ) =
2T
2T − 1AV C(q, T ),
it must be true that
MC(qT , T ) > MC(qT , T + 1).
The fall in the marginal cost when the firm adds a layer comes from the reorganization
inside the firm. QED.
In sum, I proved Proposition 1 due to Lemma 5 and Claim 1. QED.
9.3.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The first part of this proposition is true because of the shape of the AVC curve shown
in Proposition 1. I prove the second of this proposition in five steps. First, I define two
demand thresholds for a given number of layers T + 1 for future use.
Definition 2 For the number of layers T + 1, θT1 is defined as the solution to
MR(θT1, qT ) = Aβθ
1
σ
T1q
− 1
σ
T = MC(qT , T + 1) = bψ2
2− T+1
2T+1−1 q
1
2T+1−1
T .
In other words, firms with the quality draw θT1 have their marginal revenue (MR) curve
intersect the MC curve of using T + 2 layers at output level qT . θT3(> θT1) is defined as
the solution to
MR(θT3, qT ) = Aβθ
1
σ
T3q
− 1
σ
T = MC(qT , T ) = bψ2
2− T
2T−1 q
1
2T−1
T .
In other words, firms with the quality draw θT3 have their MR curve intersect the MC
curve of T + 1 layers at output level qT .
51
Figure 9: Lower and Upper Bounds on Layer-Switching from T = 1 to T = 2
The graphical representation of θT1 and θT3 is in Figure 9.
Second, I show that only when the firm’s quality draw is between [θT1, θT3], does it
have incentive to switch from T + 1 layers to T + 2 layers in the following lemma.
Lemma 6 For each T , firms having the quality draw smaller than or equal to θT1 prefer
T + 1 layers over T + 2 layers, while firms having the quality draw higher than or equal
to θT3 prefer T + 2 layers over T + 1 layers.
Proof. First, note that as MC(qT , T ) > MC(qT , T + 1) and MR(θ, q) is an increasing
function of θ for a given q, it must be true that θT1 < θT3.
Next, if a firm with θ < θT1 chose T + 2 layers, it must be true that q(θ, T + 1) < qT
which is not optimal for the firm as AV C(q, T ) < AV C(q, T +1) for output levels smaller
than qT . Thus, Firms with θ < θT1 prefer T + 1 layers over T + 2 layers. Similarly, if a
firm with θ > θT3 chose T + 1 layers, it must be true that q(θ, T ) > qT which contradicts
that AV C(q, T ) > AV C(q, T + 1) for output levels bigger than qT . Thus, Firms with
θ > θT3 prefer T + 2 layers over T + 1 layers.
Finally, when θ = θT1, choosing T + 1 layers yields more profit as
pi(θT1, T ) ≡ pi(θT1, T, q(θT1, T )) > pi(θT1, T, qT ) = pi(θT1, T + 1, qT ),
where I have used the result that AV C(qT , T ) = AV C(qT , T+1). Similarly, when θ = θT3,
choosing T + 2 layers yields more profit as
pi(θT3, T + 1) ≡ pi(θT3, T + 1, q(θT3, T + 1)) > pi(θT3, T + 1, qT ) = pi(θT3, T, qT ).
QED.
Third, I use the following lemma to show the complementarity between the benefit of
adding a layer and the quality draw θ.
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Figure 10: Optimal Choice of the Number of Layers
Lemma 7 For a given T , pi(θ, T + 1) − pi(θ, T ) increases continuously in θ for θ ∈
[θT1, θT3].
Proof. I use Figure 10 to prove this lemma. For any θ ∈ [θT1, θT3], suppose the quality
draw θ increases by ∆ > 0 which corresponds to a shift of the MR curve from the red
one to the green one. The difference between pi(θ, T ) and pi(θ + ∆, T ) is represented by
the red region, while the difference between pi(θ, T +1) and pi(θ+∆, T +1) is represented
by the sum of the red region and the blue region. Thus, I have
pi(θ + ∆, T + 1)− pi(θ + ∆, T )− [pi(θ, T + 1)− pi(θ, T )]
= [pi(θ + ∆, T + 1)− pi(θ, T + 1)]− [pi(θ + ∆, T )− pi(θ, T )]
which is the blue region. As the MR curve moves upward when θ increases and the MC
curve of T + 2 layers lies below the MC curve of T + 1 layers when q ≥ qT1, the area of
the blue region increases as ∆ increases. Thus, it must be true that
pi(θ + ∆, T + 1)− pi(θ + ∆, T )− [pi(θ, T + 1)− pi(θ, T )]
increases in ∆ which means that pi(θ, T + 1) − pi(θ, T ) increases in θ for θ ∈ [θT1, θT3].
The continuity of pi(θ, T + 1)− pi(θ, T ) in θ is straightforward to see. QED.
Fourth, I prove the following result which is the key step to prove this proposition.
More specifically, there exists a threshold θT2 ∈ (θT1, θT3) such that firms with this level
of efficiency is indifferent between having T + 1 layers and having T + 2 layers. Claim 3
summarizes the results.
Claim 2 For each T , there exists a threshold θT2 ∈ (θT1, θT3) such that firms with this
demand draw is indifferent between having T+1 layers and having T+2 layers. Moreover,
firms with a level of the demand draw smaller than θT2 strictly prefer T + 1 layers over
T + 2 layers, while firms with a level of the demand draw bigger than θT2 strictly prefer
T + 2 layers over T + 1 layers.
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Proof. From Lemma 6, I have
pi(θT1, T ) > pi(θT1, T + 1),
and
pi(θT3, T ) < pi(θT3, T + 1).
As pi(θ, T + 1) − pi(θ, T ) continuously increases in θ for θ ∈ [θT1, θT3] due to Lemma 7,
there must exist a threshold θT2 ∈ (θT1, θT3) such that
pi(θT2, T ) = pi(θT2, T + 1).
And for all θ < θT2
pi(θ, T ) > pi(θ, T + 1),
while for all θ > θT2
pi(θ, T ) < pi(θ, T + 1).
QED.
Now, I can prove this proposition by generalizing Claim 3 into the case of any two
different values of the number of layers. First, I define the upper bound and the lower
bound on the quality draw for the firm’s changing the number of layers from T0 to
T1(> T0), where T0 and T1 can be any positive numbers. The following definition is used
for this purpose.
Definition 3 For the numbers of layers T0 and T1(> T0), θT0,T1 is defined as the solution
to
MR(θ0T0,T1 , qT0,T1) = MC(qT0,T1 , T1),
where qT0,T1 is the output level at which AV C(qT0,T1 , T0) = AV C(qT0,T1 , T1). θ1T0,T1(>
θ0T0,T1) is defined as the solution to
MR(θ1T0,T1 , qT0,T1) = MC(qT0,T1 , T0).
Second, using the same approach used in the proof of Claim 3, one can prove that there
exists a quality cutoff θ2T0,T1 ∈ (θ0T0,T1 , θ1T0,T1) such that firms with quality draws bigger
than θ2T0,T1 prefer T1 + 1 layers over T0 + 1 layers can vice versa. Third, suppose there
are two firms with quality draws θ1 and θ0 > (θ1) such that the firm with quality draw
θ0 has fewer layers than the firm with quality draw θ1. I use T1 + 1 and T0 + 1(< T1 + 1)
to denote the number of layers for firms with quality draws θ1 and θ0 respectively. Form
the above discussion, it is straightforward to see that this supposition can’t be true, as
firms with quality draws bigger than θ2T0,T1 prefer T1 + 1 layers over T0 + 1 layers and
vice versa. Therefore, firms with better demand draws have more layers. QED.
Thanks to this proposition, I only need to derive the sequence of θT2 for T = 1, 2, 3...
when solving the optimal number of layers for each firm. In other words, there is no need
to solve the optimal number of layers for each firm respectively. Simulations become
much less time-consuming because of this result.
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9.3.4 Proof of Proposition 3
First, when the firm expands without changing the number of layers, both employment
and output increase continuously due to equations (13) and (15). Second, the firm’s
optimal pricing rule implies that
p(θ) =
σ
σ − 1MC(q(θ)).
As the firm’s MC increases given the number of layers and decreases discontinuously
when the firm adds a layer due to a marginal increase in θ, the firm’s price follows the
same pattern. Finally, the firm’s optimal output is
q(θ) = θAσ
( σ
σ − 1MC(q(θ))
)−σ
.
When the firm adds a layer due to a marginal increase in θ, the output increases discon-
tinuously as the price falls discontinuously. The span of control increases at all existing
layers as well which will be shown later. Therefore, employment jumps up discontinuously
due to both the decreasing span of control at existing layers and the employed workers
at the new layer. QED.
9.3.5 Proof of Proposition 4
First, equation (14) implies that the span of control increases at all layers when θ increases
and its number of layers is unchanged. Second, as the wage defined in equation (9) is
positively affected the span of control, wages increase at all layers. Third, the FOCs with
respect to employment in equation (12) show that
wi(q(θ, T (θ)), T (θ))
wi+1(q(θ, T (θ)), T (θ))
=
1
2
mi+1(q(θ, T (θ)), T (θ))
mi(q(θ, T (θ)), T (θ))
=
1
2
xi(q(θ, T (θ)), T (θ))
for T (θ) > i ≥ 1. As the span of control increases at all layers, relative wages increase at
all layers as well.
Finally, I prove the employment hierarchy that the number of workers is smaller in
upper layers.46 As I consider the employment hierarchy for workers, the minimum value
for T is two. Equation (13) shows
mi+1(q(θ, T (θ)), T (θ))
mi(q(θ, T (θ)), T (θ))
= 2
[q(θ, T (θ))
2T (θ)
] 2T (θ)−(i+1)
2T (θ)−1 ≥
[q(θ, T (θ))
2T (θ)−1
] 2T (θ)−(i+1)
2T (θ)−1 ,
as T (θ) ≥ 2 and T (θ) > i ≥ 1. Now, I show the following property of qT−1 that is the
key step to prove the result of the employment hierarchy:47
qT−1
2T−1
=
[2T − 1
2T − 2
] (2T−1−1)(2T−1)
2T−1
2
1
2T−1−1 > 1.
This is because [2T − 1
2T − 2
] (2T−1−1)(2T−1)
2T−1
2
1
2T−1−1
46This result will be used later.
47qT is defined in Definition 1.
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increases in T for T ≥ 2 and achieves its minimum value of 1.299 when T = 2. In total,
mi+1(q(θ, T (θ)), T (θ))
mi(q(θ, T (θ)), T (θ))
≥
[q(θ, T (θ))
2T (θ)−1
] 2T (θ)−(i+1)
2T (θ)−1 >
[qT (θ)−1
2T (θ)−1
] 2T (θ)−(i+1)
2T (θ)−1 > 1.
Therefore, the employment hierarchy holds for workers. QED.
9.3.6 Proof of Proposition 5
First of all, keep in mind that I am considering a small change in θ from θT0,2 − ∆ to
θT0,2 + ∆ that triggers the addition of one layer into the hierarchy. Note that θT0,2 is the
demand threshold where the firm switches from having T0 + 1 layers to having T0 + 2
layers.
As the change in the span of control is the key to prove this proposition, I prove that
the span of control falls at all existing layers first. From equations (13) and (15), I have
m∗i
m∗i−1
∣∣∣
T0
= 2
[βA(θT0,2 −∆) 1σ
4bψ2
T0
σ
] σ2T0−i
σ+(2T0−1)
.
and
m∗i+1
m∗i
∣∣∣
T0+1
= 2
[βA(θT0,2 + ∆) 1σ
4bψ2
T0+1
σ
] σ2T0−i
σ+(2T0+1−1)
,
where ∆ is infinitesimally small. Thus, what I have to prove is that
Z(θT0,2, T0) =
[βAθ 1σT0,2
4bψ2
T0
σ
] 1
σ+(2T0−1)
decreases with T0 at θT0,2. Calculation shows that
Sign
[
dZ(θT0,2, T0)/dT0
]
= Sign
[
ln 2
[− 2T0 (ln βAθ
1
σ
T0,2
4bψ
− ln 2T0
σ
)
2T0 + (σ − 1) −
1
σ
]]
.
Obviously, if
βAθ
1
σ
T0,2
4bψ2
T0
σ
≥ 1,
then the proof is done. So, I only need to consider the case where
βAθ
1
σ
T0,2
4bψ2
T0
σ
< 1.
For this case, there is a lower bound on the above term due to the result that θT0,2 > θT0,1.
Thus, I only have to prove that
−2T0 (ln
βAθ
1
σ
T0,1
4bψ
− ln 2T0
σ
)
2T0 + (σ − 1) −
1
σ
< 0.
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Based on Definition 2, θT0,1 can be rewritten as
MR(θT0,1, qT0) = Aβθ
1
σ
T0,1q
− 1
σ
T0 = MC(qT0, T0 + 1) = bψ2
2− T0+1
2T0+1−1 q
1
2T0+1−1
T0 .
Thus, I can solve θT0,1 as
θT0,1 =
(bψ2
2− T0+1
2T0+1−1 )σq
σ+(2T0+1−1)
2T0+1−1
T0
(Aβ)σ
.
Consequently, I have
2T0
(ln
βAθ
1
σ
T0,1
4bψ
− ln 2T0
σ
)
2T0 + (σ − 1) =
2T0(σ + (2T0+1 − 1))
(σ + (2T0 − 1))σ(2T0+1 − 1) ln
(qT0
2T0
)
− 2
T0
(σ + (2T0 − 1))(2T0+1 − 1) ln 2.
As qT0
2T0
> 1 for T0 ≥ 1 due to the proof in Appendix 9.3.5, I conclude that
−2T0 (ln
βAθ
1
σ
T0,1
4bψ
− ln 2T0
σ
)
2T0 + (σ − 1) −
1
σ
<
2T0
(σ + (2T0 − 1))(2T0+1 − 1) ln 2−
1
σ
< 0
for all T0 ≥ 1. In total, I conclude that
−2T0 (ln
βAθ
1
σ
T0,2
4bψ
− ln 2T0
σ
)
2T0 + (σ − 1) −
1
σ
< 0
for all θT0,2. As ∆ is infinitesimally small, It must be true that
m∗i
m∗i−1
∣∣∣
T0
>
m∗i+1
m∗i
∣∣∣
T0+1
for all i and T0 ≥ 1. Therefore, the span of control must fall at all existing layers when
the firm adds a layer.
Next, as the wage at layer i is
wi(θ) = bψ
mi(θ, T )
mi−1(θ, T )
,
wages fall at all existing layers when the firm adds a layer.
Third, as the relative wage is proportional to the span of control or
wi−1(θ)
wi(θ)
=
mi(θ, T )
2mi−1(θ, T )
,
relative wages also fall at all existing layers when the firm adds a layer.
Finally, total employment increases discontinuously when the firm adds layer, as out-
put increases discontinuously, and the span of control fall at existing layers. QED.
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9.3.7 Proof of Proposition 6
Let me write out the expression of unit costs given T + 1 layers as follows:
UCT (q, b) = (2− 1
2T−1
)bψ21−
T
2T−1 q
1
2T−1 +
f0
q
.
First, taking the FOC of the above equation with respect to q results in
∂UCT (q, b)
∂q
=
1
2T−1
bψ21−
T
2T−1 q
−(2T−2)
2T−1 − f0
q2
. (61)
There exists a unique qTm(b) given T and b such that the above equation equals zero.
Moreover, ∂UCT (q,b)
∂q
> 0 if and only if q > qTm(b) and vice versa. Therefore, the curve of
unit costs given T and b is “U” shaped, which implies that firm productivity given T and
b has an inverted “U” shape.
Next, it is straightforward to observe that
lim
q→∞
∂UCT (q, b)
∂q
= 0
given T and b. Therefore, the slope of unit costs approaches zero given T and b when
output goes to infinity.
Third, the MES given T and b can be solved as follows:
qTm(b) =
[ f0
4bψ
] 2T
2T−1
2T . (62)
A sufficiency and necessary condition for {qTm(b)}T=1,2,3... to be an increasing sequence
is that
4f0 > bψ.
Finally, I need to derive the condition under which {MUCT (b)}T=1,2,3... is a decreasing
sequence, or
AV CT+1(qT+1,m(b), b) +
f0
qT+1,m(b)
< AV CT (qT,m(b), b) +
f0
qT,m(b)
∀T ≥ 1 (63)
One key observation is that equation (61) implies
1
2T − 1
AV CT (qT,m(b), b)
qT,m(b)
=
f0
qT,m(b)2
. (64)
From equation (64), I conclude that
AV CT (qT,m(b), b) +
f0
qT,m(b)
= (2T − 1) f0
qT,m(b)
+
f0
qT,m(b)
= 2T
f0
qT,m(b)
. (65)
Substituting equation (65) into equation (63) leads to
MUCT (b) > MUCT+1(b),
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if and only if
qT+1,m(b) > 2qT,m(b),
where T = 1, 2, 3... The expression of qTm(b) in equation (62) implies that
qT+1,m(b) > 2qT,m(b),
if and only if
f0 > 4bψ.
In total, if f0 > 4bψ, {qTm(b)}T=1,2,3... is an increasing sequence, and {MUCT (b)}T=1,2,3...
is a decreasing sequence. QED.
9.3.8 Proof of Proposition 7
The strategy to prove this proposition is the following. First, I assume that the incentive
compatible wage defined in equation (9) satisfies the constraint indicated in equation (31)
in every labor submarket and prove that there is a unique equilibrium with unemployment
in every labor submarket. Second, I show that there is a non-empty set of parameter
values within which the incentive compatible wage defined in equation (8) satisfies the
constraint indicated in equation (31) in every labor submarket.
First, I redefine the equilibrium using three conditions. Substituting equation (11)
into equation (25) leads to the homogeneous sector’s employment expressed as
Lh =
(1− γ)AσP 1−σ
γph
. (66)
Substituting the above equation and equation (29) into equation (29) yields the following
labor market clearing condition:
WP (θ¯, A,M)− ψLD(θ¯, A,M)
ph
+
(1− γ)AσP 1−σ
γph
= L. (67)
Now, the equilibrium of the economy can be solved using three equations (i.e., equations
(23), (24) and (67)). As a result, I obtain three endogenous variables: θ, A and ph.
Values of other equilibrium variables can be solved using θ, A and ph derived above.
First, the ideal price index is
P =
1
p
1−γ
γ
h
(68)
due to equation (4). Second, the ideal price index defined in equation (5) can be reex-
pressed as
P =
(∫ ∞
θ=θ¯
θp(θ)1−σM
g(θ)
1−G(θ¯)dθ
) 1
1−σ ≡ P1(θ¯, A)M 11−σ . (69)
This is because prices charged by various firms in the CES sector only depend on A and
θ. Thus, the mass of firms M can be derived by using equations (68) and (69) and values
of θ¯, A and ph. Third, the aggregate income E can be derived by using equation (11)
and value of A and P . Finally, the allocation of labor can be obtained by using equations
(29) and (66) and value of A, P and ph.
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Now I show why I can use three variables (i.e., θ¯, A and M) to derive both the aggre-
gate wage payment and the number of employed workers in the CES sector. In equation
(10), only A and θ affect firm’s optimal choices given values of exogenous parameters b
and ψ. As firms endogenously choose whether or not to stay in the market, wage payment
per active firm and employment per active firm are functions of (A, θ¯) only. Therefore,
I can use three variables (i.e., A, θ and M) to derive both the aggregate wage payment
and the number of employed workers in the CES sector.
Next, the following claim shows the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in
the CES sector.
Claim 3 There exists a unique equilibrium for the CES sector characterized by a unique
pair of (θ¯, A).
Proof. I have two equilibrium conditions: the ZCP condition and the FE condition. I
have two endogenous variables to be pinned down: the exit cutoff θ¯ and the adjusted
market size A. Let us think about the ZCP condition first. The goal is to establish a
negative relationship between θ¯ and A from this condition. Suppose A increases from
A0 to A1(> A0) in equation (23). If the exit cutoff θ¯ increased from θ¯0 to θ¯1(≥ θ¯0), the
following contradiction would appear.
0 = Π(θ¯1, A1) ≡ pi(θ¯1, T (θ¯1, A1), A1)− f
≥ pi(θ¯1, T (θ¯0, A0), A1)− f
> pi(θ¯0, T (θ¯0, A0), A0)− f = Π(θ¯0, A0) = 0.
The first inequality comes from firm’s revealed preference on the number of layers, and
the second inequality is due to the fact that firm’s profit function defined in equation (16)
strictly increases with both θ andA. Therefore, equation (23) leads a negative relationship
between θ¯ and A. Of course, when θ¯ approaches zero, A determined from equation
(23) approaches infinity. And when θ¯ goes to infinity, A determined from equation (23)
approaches zero.
Second, let me discuss the FE condition. The goal is to show that for all pairs of
(θ¯, A) that satisfy the ZCP condition, there is a positive relationship between these two
variables determined by the FE condition. Suppose θ¯ decreases from θ¯0 to θ¯1(< θ¯0) in
equation (24). If the adjusted market size A increased from A to A1(≥ A0), the following
result must be true.
fe =
∫ ∞
θ¯1
Π(θ, A1)g(θ)dθ
=
∫ θ¯0
θ¯1
Π(θ, A1)g(θ)dθ +
∫ ∞
θ¯0
Π(θ, A1)g(θ)dθ
>
∫ ∞
θ¯0
Π(θ, A1)g(θ)dθ
>
∫ ∞
θ¯0
Π(θ, A0)g(θ)dθ
= fe,
which is a contradiction. In the above derivation, I have implicitly used the ZCP condition
which implies Π(θ, A1) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ [θ¯1, θ¯0]. In total, the downward sloping ZCP curve
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and upward sloping FE curve intersects only once, and the intersection pins down a
unique pair of (θ¯, A) for the product market equilibrium.
Now, I prove the uniqueness. Suppose there were two pairs of (θ¯, A) (i.e., (θ¯1, A1)
and (θ¯2, A2)) that satisfy both the ZCP condition and the FE condition. Without loss
of generosity, let me assume that θ¯1 > θ¯2. Due to the property of the ZCP condition, it
must be true that A1 < A2 which contradicts the positive relationship between θ¯ and A
implied by the FE condition. Therefore, the equilibrium must be unique.
Finally, I prove the existence. For any A ∈ (0,∞), there exists a unique θ¯(A) with
θ¯
′
(A) < 0 determined by the ZCP condition. Furthermore, θ¯(A) decreases continuously
in A, as the firm’s profit function with the optimal number of layers increases continu-
ously with θ conditional on A. Therefore, among those (A, θ¯(A)) that satisfy the ZCP
condition, there must be a pair of (θ¯, A) that satisfies the FE condition. QED.
Third, the following claim shows that there is a unique ph that clears the labor market
in general.
Claim 4 When σ−1
σ
6= γ and parameter values satisfy certain conditions, there exists a
unique wage ph that clears the labor market given that the product markets are cleared.
Proof. First, let me decompose the total wage payment of the CES sector and the number
of workers employed in the CES sector into the following two parts:
WP (θ¯, A,M) = WPper(A, θ¯) ∗M
and
LD(θ¯, A,M) = LDper(A, θ¯) ∗M,
where “per” means per firm. Second, Substituting the above two expressions into equa-
tion (67) yields
WCper(A, θ¯)− ψLDper(A, θ¯)
ph
M +
(1− γ)AσP 1−σ
γph
= L. (70)
Next, substituting equation (69) into equation (4) leads to the expression of M in terms
of ph and P1(θ¯, A) as follows:
M = p
(1−γ)(σ−1)
γ
h P1(θ¯, A)
σ−1. (71)
Finally, substituting equations (69) and (71) into equation (67) results in the following
labor market clearing condition:[
WCper(A, θ¯)− ψLDper(A, θ¯)
]
P1(θ¯, A)
σ−1 +
(1− γ)Aσ
γ
= p
1− (1−γ)(σ−1)
γ
h L. (72)
There exists a unique ph that satisfies the above equation, as long as
(1−γ)(σ−1)
γ
6= 1.48
Moreover, equilibrium ph must satisfy the condition that
wmin ≥ ψ(i) + ph,
48Note that I have implicitly used the product market equilibrium conditions to derive the above
equation.
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where wmin is the minimum wage offered in the CES sector. This puts a constraint on
parameter values, which I will discuss soon. QED.
There are three effects on the labor market when the price of the homogeneous good
goes up. First, as ph is the wage offered in the homogeneous sector, labor demand of
firms in the homogeneous sector goes down. Second, as ph is the outside option for
workers entering the CES sector, the number of them must go down in order to make
the worker who chooses to enter the CES sector earn higher expected payoff.49 These
two negative effects on the labor demand are reflected by ph that appears in the left
hand side of equation (70). Finally, increasing market size due to a bigger ph makes
the aggregate income E(= AσP 1−σ) and the mass of firms M increase which pushes up
the aggregate labor demand in the end. Therefore, whether or not the aggregate labor
demand increases with ph depends on whether or not the third (positive) effect dominates
the first two negative effects. However, in either case, the aggregate labor demand is a
monotonic function of ph which assures the uniqueness of ph that clears the labor market.
With Claim 3 and Claim 4 in hand, I only have to show that there is a non-empty
set of parameter values within which the incentive compatible wage defined in equation
(9) satisfies the constraint indicated in equation (31) in every labor submarket. In other
words, I have to show that the minimum wage offered in the CES sector is weakly bigger
than the wage offered in the homogeneous sector plus the disutility of exerting effort, or
wmin ≥ ψ(i) + ph.
First, note that labor endowment L does not affect wages and the minimum wage offered
in the CES sector. This is because the solution of (θ¯, A) in equilibrium does not depend
on L, and wages offered by firms in the CES sector only depend on (θ¯, A, b).50 Second,
equation (72) indicates that ph approaches zero when L approaches zero and
σ−1
σ
> γ,
and ph approaches zero when L goes to infinity and
σ−1
σ
< γ. Therefore, I conclude that
there must exist a small enough L such that
wmin − ψ > ph,
when σ−1
σ
> γ. Similarly, there must exist a big enough L such that
wmin − ψ > ph,
when σ−1
σ
< γ.
In total, I show that with restrictions on parameter values, there must exist a unique
equilibrium with unemployment in every labor submarket. The equilibrium is character-
ized by a unique quadruplet (θ¯, M , ph, E). QED.
9.3.9 Proof of Proposition 8
This proof consists of seven parts. I prove that the exit cutoff for the quality draw
increases and all firms increase the number of layers first.
49Remember that the labor demand per firm in the CES sector is independent of ph conditional on
(A,θ¯).
50Labor endowment L affects the job-acceptance-rates in various labor submarkets and accordingly
the expected wage of entering the CES sector.
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I make the following notations. Suppose b decreases from b1 to b2(< b1) due to an
improvement in MT. Let θ¯1 (or θ¯2) be the demand threshold for exiting when b = b1 (or
b = b2). Let A1 (or A2) be the adjusted market size when b = b1 (or b = b2).
First, I discuss how the adjusted market size A changes when b decreases by proving
the following lemma.
Lemma 8 When b decrease from b1 to b2, the change in the adjusted market size must
satisfy
1 >
A2
A1
>
b2
b1
.
Proof. First, note that if A2 ≥ A1, the exit cutoff θ¯ must decrease as b2 < b1. However,
a decreasing exit cutoff plus a weakly increasing adjusted market size violate the FE
condition defined in Equation (24). Thus, it must be true that A2 < A1. Second, if
A2
A1
≤ b2
b1
, the profit defined as the solution to Equation (10) must decrease for all firms.
Thus, the exit cutoff must increase. However, the FE condition is violated again, as profit
for all firms decreases, and the exit cutoff increases. In total, it must be true that
1 >
A2
A1
>
b2
b1
.
QED.
Second, I show that all firms increase the number of layers weakly. It is straightforward
to observe that if A2
A1
= b2
b1
, the optimal output, employment, and the number of layers
would be unchanged. As I have proven that A2
A1
> b2
b1
in Lemma 8, all surviving firms
weakly increase their number of layers. Furthermore, all surviving firms increase their
output as well as employment after the management technology improves.
Third, I prove that the exit cutoff increases. I use T0 + 1 ≡ T (θ¯1, A1, b1) + 1 =
T (θ¯2, A2, b2) + 1 to denote the number of layers for firms on the exit cutoff and prove
this result by contradiction. Suppose that the exit cutoff θ¯ decreased weakly after MT
improves (i.e., θ¯2 ≤ θ¯1). First, firms on the exit cutoff earn zero payoff due to the ZCP
condition or
pi(θ¯1, T (θ¯1, A1, b1), A1, b1) = pi(θ¯2, T (θ¯2, A2, b2), A2, b2) = f,
as T0 = T (θ¯1, A1, b1) = T (θ¯2, A2, b2). This leads to
pi(θ¯2, T0, A2, b2)
pi(θ¯1, T0, A1, b1)
=
( θ¯2
θ¯1
) 2T0
σ+(2T0−1)
(A2
A1
) 2T0σ
σ+(2T0−1)
(b1
b2
) (σ−1)2T0
σ+2T0−1
(2T0−1)
2T0
≡ X(θ¯, T0)Y (A, T0)Z(b, T0) = 1,
where θ¯ = θ¯2
θ¯1
, A ≡ A2
A1
< 1, and b ≡ b1
b2
> 1. As θ¯2 ≤ θ¯1,
Y (A, T0)Z(b, T0) ≥ 1.
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Second, For a firm whose demand draw is higher than θ¯1, its profit must increase if it
does not change the number of layers. This is because51
pi(θ, T (θ, A2, b2), A2, b2)
pi(θ, T (θ, A1, b1), A1, b1)
=
(A2
A1
) 2T (θ)σ
σ+(2T (θ)−1)
(b1
b2
) (σ−1)2T (θ)
σ+(2T (θ)−1)
(2T (θ)−1)
2T (θ)
≥
(A2
A1
) 2T0σ
σ+(2T0−1)
(b1
b2
) (σ−1)2T0
σ+(2T0−1)
(2T0−1)
2T0 ≥ 1,
where T (θ) ≡ T (θ, A1, b1) = T (θ, A2, b2) and T (θ) ≥ T0 as θ ≥ θ¯1. If the firm endoge-
nously changes the number of layers, its profit must be bigger than the profit it earns
when b = b1 as well due to the revealed preference argument. In total, I have
pi(θ, T (θ, A2, b2), A2, b2) ≥ pi(θ, T (θ, A1, b1), A1, b1) ∀ θ ≥ θ¯1
for T (θ, A2, b2) = T (θ, A1, b1) and
pi(θ, T (θ, A2, b2), A2, b2) > pi(θ, T (θ, A1, b1), A1, b1) ∀ θ > θ¯1
for T (θ, A2, b2) > T (θ, A1, b1). Third, the ZCP condition in the new equilibrium implies
that firms with the quality draws between θ¯2 and θ¯1 earn non-negative profit. In total, the
expected profit from entry would exceed the entry cost fe if the exit cutoff decreased which
violates the FE condition. Therefore, the exit cutoff must increase when b decreases.
Fourth, I prove that the distribution of the number of layers moves to the right in the
FOSD sense when MT improves. I make the following simplifying notations. Let θT,2 be
the threshold for the quality draw at which the firm increases the number of layers from
T + 1 to T + 2. Let Prob(t > T, b) be the fraction of firms that have at least T + 2 layers
when the quality of MT is b. Based on the above notations and the Pareto distribution
on θ, I have
Prob(t > T, b) =
( θ¯
θT,2
)k
.
Therefore, the condition for Prob(t > T, b2) > Prob(t > T, b1) to hold is
θ¯1
θT,2
∣∣∣
b=b1
<
θ¯2
θT,2
∣∣∣
b=b2
,
where T ≥ T0. I derive the expression for θT,2 and prove the above inequality in what
follows. First, conditional on (b, A), the threshold for the firm to add a layers is
θ
2T+1
σ+(2T+1−1)−
2T
σ+(2T−1)
T,2 =
b
(σ−1)(2T+1−1)
σ+(2T+1−1) −
(σ−1)(2T−1)
σ+(2T−1) (1− β(2T−1)
2T
)
(
ψ2
2T+2−2−(T+1)
2T+1−1 /β
) (σ−1)(2T+1−1)
σ+(2T+1−1)
A
σ2T+1
σ+(2T+1−1)−
σ2T
σ+(2T−1) (1− β(2T+1−1)
2T+1
)
(
ψ2
2T+1−2−T
2T−1 /β
) (σ−1)(2T−1)
σ+(2T−1)
Thus, the ratio of
θT,2|b=b1
θT,2|b=b2
can be written as
(θT,2|b=b1
θT,2|b=b2
) 2T+1
σ+(2T+1−1)−
2T
σ+(2T−1)
= b
(σ−1)(2T+1−1)
σ+(2T+1−1) −
(σ−1)(2T−1)
σ+(2T−1) A
σ2T+1
σ+(2T+1−1)−
σ2T
σ+(2T−1) ,
51Taking the log of pi(θ,T,A2,b2)pi(θ,T,A1,b1) leads to B(T,A, b) ≡ 2
Tσ
σ+2T−1 log(A) +
(σ−1)2T
σ+2T−1
(2T−1)
2T
log(b). As
B(T0, A, b) > 0 and log(b) > 0, B(T,A, b) ≥ B(T0, A, b) > 1 for all T ≥ T0.
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where A ≡ A2
A1
< 1, and b ≡ b1
b2
> 1. This expression can be simplified further to
θT,2|b=b1
θT,2|b=b2
= (bA)σ. (73)
Second, from the expression of firm’s profit function derived in Equation (16), I have
θ¯1
θ¯2
= Aσb
(σ−1)(1− 1
2T0
)
. (74)
Finally, from equations (73) and (74), I conclude that
θ¯2
θT,2|b=b2
θ¯1
θT,2|b=b1
=
θ¯1b
σ
θ¯2b
(σ−1)(1− 1
2T0
)
θ¯2
θ¯1
> 1.
Therefore, for all T ≥ T0, Prob(t > T, b2) > Prob(t > T, b1) which is the condition for
the result of the FOSD to hold.
Fifth, I prove that the firm size distribution in terms of revenue moves to the right
in the FOSD sense when MT improves. I make the following simplifying notations. Let
S(θ¯i, Ai) ≡ S(θ¯i, Ai, T (θ¯i, Ai))i=1,2 be the revenue for firms with quality draw θ¯i when
they optimally choose the number of layers, and S(θ¯i, Ai, T ) be the revenue for firms
with quality draw θ¯i when they choose to have T + 1 number of layers. Similarly, let
q(θ¯i, Ai) ≡ q(θ¯i, Ai, T (θ¯i, Ai)) be the output for firms with quality draw θ¯i when they
optimally choose the number of layers, and q(θ¯i, Ai, T ) be the output for firms with
quality draw θ¯i when they choose to have T + 1 number of layers.
As the distribution of θ is Pareto, and the firm’s revenue increases with θ, what I have
to show is that for any t > 1,
S(tθ¯2, A2) ≥ S(tθ¯1, A1).
As the distribution of the number of layers after an improvement in MT first order
stochastically dominates the one before the management technology improves, I have the
following two cases:
T (tθ¯2, A2) = T (tθ¯1, A1)
or
T (tθ¯2, A2) > T (tθ¯1, A1).
I discuss these two cases one by one in what follows.
In the case of T (tθ¯2, A2) = T (tθ¯1, A1), if t is small enough such that T (tθ¯2, A2) =
T (tθ¯1, A1) = T0, then it is straightforward to see that
S(tθ¯2, A2) = S(tθ¯1, A1).
For T (tθ¯2, A2) = T (tθ¯1, A1) = T1 > T0, I have
S(tθ¯2, A2) = S(θ¯2, A2)V 1(t, T0, T1)
(θ¯2A
σ
2 )
2T1
σ+(2T1−1)−
2T0
σ+(2T0−1)
b
(σ−1)(2T1−1)
σ+(2T1−1) −
(σ−1)(2T0−1)
σ+(2T0−1)
2
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and
S(tθ¯1, A1) = S(θ¯1, A1)V 1(t, T0, T1)
(θ¯1A
σ
1 )
2T1
σ+(2T1−1)−
2T0
σ+(2T0−1)
b
(σ−1)(2T1−1)
σ+(2T1−1) −
(σ−1)(2T0−1)
σ+(2T0−1)
1
,
where V 1(t, T0, T1) is a function of (t, T0, T1). As S(θ¯2, A2) = S(θ¯1, A1) =
f
1−β(2T0−1)
2T0
and
θ¯1
θ¯2
= Aσb
(σ−1)(1− 1
2T0
)
Based on Equation (74), I conclude that
S(tθ¯2, A2)
S(tθ¯1, A1)
=
[(1
b
)(σ−1)(1− 1
2T0
)
bσ
](σ−1) 2T1−2T0
(σ+2T1−1)(σ+2T0−1)
> 1. (75)
In the case of T (tθ¯2, A2) = T2 > T (tθ¯1, A1) = T1, I prove S(tθ¯2, A2) > S(tθ¯1, A1)
using the result that when the firm optimally chooses to add a layer, output jumps up
discontinuously. Note that
S(tθ¯2, A2, T1)
S(tθ¯1, A1, T1)
≥ 1,
and the equality holds only when T1 = T0 due to Equation (75). when the firm optimally
chooses to add layers, it must be true that
q(tθ¯2, A2, T2) > q(tθ¯2, A2, T1)
and
S(tθ¯2, A2, T2) = A2(tθ¯2)
1
σ q(tθ¯2, A2, T2)
β
> S(tθ¯2, A2, T1) = A2(tθ¯2)
1
σ q(tθ¯2, A2, T1)
β
> S(tθ¯1, A1, T1).
Thus, S(tθ¯2, A2) must be bigger than or equal to S(tθ¯1, A1) in all possible cases. Espe-
cially, S(tθ¯2, A2) = S(tθ¯1, A1) only when T (tθ¯2, A2) = T (tθ¯1, A1) = T0. Therefore, the
result of the FOSD for the distribution of firms’ revenue follows.
Sixth, I prove the result of FOSD for the distribution of the firms’ output and em-
ployment. Similar to what I have proven above, the goal is to show that for any t > 1,
q(tθ¯2, A2) ≥ q(tθ¯1, A1).
for all t > 1. First, I prove that when T (θ¯1, A1) = T (θ¯2, A2) = T0,
q(θ¯2, A2, T0) > q(θ¯1, A1, T0).
To see this, note that
TV C(q(θ¯2, A2, T0), b2, T0) =
β(2T0 − 1)
2T0
S(θ¯2, A2, T0)
= TV C(q(θ¯1, A1, T0), b1, T0) =
β(2T0 − 1)
2T0
S(θ¯1, A1, T0),
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where
TV C(q, T, b) = (2− 1
2T−1
)bψ2
1− T
2T−1 q
1
2T−1 ,
S(θ¯2, A2, T0) = S(θ¯1, A1, T0) =
f
1− β(2T0−1)
2T0
and
b1 > b2.
Second, Based on the above result I derive that
q(tθ¯2, A2, T0) = q(θ¯2, A2, T0)t
2T0−1
σ+2T0−1 > q(θ¯1, A1, T0)t
2T0−1
σ+2T0−1 = q(tθ¯1, A1, T0),
if T (tθ¯2, A2) = T (tθ¯1, A1) = T0. Third, if T (tθ¯2, A2) = T (tθ¯1, A1) = T1 > T0, I have
q(tθ¯2, A2, T1) = q(θ¯2, A2, T0)V 2(t, T0, T1)
(A2θ¯ 1σ2
b2
) σ(2T1−1)
σ+(2T1−1)−
σ(2T0−1)
σ+(2T0−1)
and
q(tθ¯1, A1, T1) = q(θ¯1, A1, T0)V 2(t, T0, T1)
(A1θ¯ 1σ1
b1
) σ(2T1−1)
σ+(2T1−1)−
σ(2T0−1)
σ+(2T0−1) ,
where V 2(t, T0, T1) is a function of (t, T0, T1). Based on equation (74), I conclude that
q(tθ¯2, A2, T1)
q(tθ¯1, A1, T1)
=
q(θ¯2, A2, T0)
q(θ¯1, A1, T0)
(
b
σ+(2T0−1)
σ2T0
) σ(2T1−1)
σ+(2T1−1)−
σ(2T0−1)
σ+(2T0−1) > 1,
as T1 > T0, b > 1, and q(θ¯2, A2, T0) > q(θ¯1, A1, T0). Fourth, for T (tθ¯2, A2) = T2 >
T (tθ¯1, A1) = T1, I have
q(tθ¯2, A2, T1) > q(tθ¯1, A1, T1)
and
q(tθ¯2, A2, T2) > q(tθ¯2, A2, T1),
where the second inequality comes from the result that when the firm optimally chooses
to add layers output jumps up discontinuously. Therefore, it must be true that
q(tθ¯2, A2, T2) > q(tθ¯1, A1, T1)
for T2 > T1 as well. This completes the proof for the FOSD result on the distribution of
the firms’ output. Finally, as firms with the same level of output (i.e., the same number
of production workers) have the same employment, the result of the FOSD holds for the
distribution of the firms’ employment as well.
Seventh, I prove that all firms increase the span of control given the number of layers
when MT improves. First, the span of control is defined as
SCi(T, q(θ, b, A, T (θ, b, A))) =
mi+1(T, q(θ, b, A, T (θ, b, A)))
mi(T, q(θ, b, A, T (θ, b, A)))
, (76)
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where (T − 1) ≥ i ≥ 0, and q(θ, b, A, T (θ, b, A)) is the number of production workers as
well as output. Consider a firm with quality draw θ that does not adjust the number of
layers after MT improves. This means
T (θ, b1, A1) = T (θ, b2, A2).
Its output and the number of production workers must increase as52
A2
b2
>
A1
b1
.
The span of control calculated in equation (14) increases with the number of production
workers. Therefore, every surviving firm increases its span of control at all layers if it
does not adjusted the number of layers after MT improves. QED.
9.3.10 Proof of Lemma 2
I make several notations before the proof. Let A0 be the adjusted market size for all
firms in the closed economy. Denote the adjusted market size faced by non-exporters
and exporters in the open economy by A1 and A2(> A1) respectively. As countries are
symmetric, I only need to discuss what happens to domestic firms. First, note that what
matters for the firm’s profit is the adjusted market size A. Second, suppose that the exit
cutoff stayed the same or decreased after the economy opens up to trade. This would
immediately imply that A2 > A1 ≥ A0 due to the ZCP condition and the result that
firms on the exit cutoff are non-exporting firm. In other words, all surviving firms are
facing the bigger adjusted market size than before. However, this result together with the
FE condition would imply that the exit cutoff goes up which contradicts the assumption
that the exit cutoff either stayed the same or decreased. Therefore, the exit cutoff must
increase after the economy opens up to trade. Third, due to this result, the adjusted
market size faced by non-exporters must go down when the economy moves from autarky
to trade (i.e., A0 > A1). Finally, suppose that the adjusted market size faced by exporters
also went down weakly (i.e., (A1 <)A2 ≤ A0). This would imply that both exporters and
non-exporters lose in the open economy. This result and the result that the exit cutoff
for the quality draw increases when the economy opens up to trade would violate the
FE condition. Therefore, it must be the case that A2 > A0 > A1 in equilibrium. This
means that exporters gain and non-exporters lose when the economy moves from autarky
to trade. QED
9.3.11 Proof of Proposition 9
The firm’s optimization problem defined implies that an increase (or a decrease) in A
has the same effect on firm-level outcomes (i.e., revenue, employment, and output) as
an increase (or a decrease) in θ
1
σ . It is straightforward to observe that firm’s revenue,
employment, and output increase in θ, and Lemma 2 shows that the adjusted market
size increases for exporters and decreases for non-exporters after the economy opens up
to trade. Therefore, non-exporters’ revenue, employment, and output go down, and
52For detailed proof of this result, see Appendix 9.3.9.
68
exporters’ revenue, employment, and output go up after the economy opens up to trade.
As it has been shown that the number of layers is an increasing function of output,
non-exporters de-layers and exporters increase their number of layers after the economy
opens up to trade. Since the firm increases the span of control when it adds a layer
and decreases the span of control when it deletes a layer. Therefore, non-exporters that
de-layer increase the span of control at the same time, while exporters that add a layer
decrease the span of control. Finally, as wage payment in my paper is incentive-based
and increases with the span of control, non-exporters increase the use of incentive-based
pay when they de-layer. QED.
9.4 A Continuous Number of Layers: the Closed Economy
In this subsection, I treat the number of layers as a continuous variable a` la Keren and
Levhari (1979) and Qian (1994). First, I show that the main results established in the
paper (i.e., Proposition 8) hold in all possible cases when the number of layers is treated
as a continuous variable. Second, I derive a condition under which the type of equilibrium
I investigate exists, and the condition only consists of exogenous parameters. Finally, I
obtain qualitative results on the welfare effect of an improvement in MT.
The only change in the specifications of the model from the paper is the treatment
of the number of layers. First, the effort choice is still treated as a binary variable. As
a result, every worker is incentivized to exert effort in equilibrium. Second, the economy
still consists of two sectors: a traditional sector and a CES sector. Third, workers can
still choose which type of jobs to apply for. Based on these specifications, I can express
the firm’s optimization problem as
maxsi,T Aθ
1
σxβT −
∫ T
t=0
gstxtdt (77)
s.t. x˙t = xt log(st)
x0 = 1,
where g ≡ bψ. Now, the firm chooses the span of control at each layer as well as the
number of layers in equilibrium.53 Different from the optimization problem in Qian
(1994), the problem now becomes an “open-final-time” (i.e., T ) and “open-end-point”
(i.e., xT ) optimal control problem with one state variable xt and one control variable st.
I solve this optimization problem in the following several steps. First, the correspond-
ing Hamiltonian is
H(t) = −gstxt + ptxt log(st).
The corresponding optimality conditions are
p˙t = gst − pt log(st), (78)
−gxt + ptxt/st = 0 (79)
and
H(t) = −gstxt + ptxt log(st) = 0. (80)
53For more details, see Qian (1994).
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Above three conditions are exactly the same as in Qian (1994), as these three conditions
are sufficient and necessary conditions for an “open-final-time” and “fixed-end-point”
optimal control problem. Moreover, there is an additional transversality condition for
this “open-final-time” and “open-end-point” problem as follows:54
pT =
∂Aθ
1
σxβT
∂xT
= Aβ
( θ
xT
) 1
σ
= gsT . (81)
Next, based on equations (78) to (81), I derive closed-form solutions for this optimal
control proble as follows:
st = e, wt = ge, xt = e
t, xT (θ, A) = θ
(Aβ
ge
)σ
, T = log θ + σ log
(Aβ
ge
)
, (82)
where e is Euler’s number and equals 2.71828... Total employment is
l(θ, A) =
∫ T
t=0
xtdt = (xT − 1). (83)
The resulting operating profit and revenue are
pi(θ, A) = (1− β)Aσθ
( β
ge
)σ−1
+ ge (84)
and
S(θ, A) = Aσθ
( β
ge
)σ−1
(85)
respectively. The operating profit function in equation (84) is similar to the standard
operating profit function in models with the CES preference except that it includes an
additional term (i.e., ge). This implies that the Free Entry (FE) condition of the current
model is the same as the in Melitz (2003) except that the implied fixed cost now becomes
f − ge.55
Third, I prove the main result of this subsection. As in the paper, I still assume that
the quality draw follows a Pareto distribution with parameter k.
G(θ) = 1−
(θmin
θ
)k
,
where G(θ) is the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of θ.56
Proposition 10 When the quality of MT improves in an economy (i.e., b decreases),
the exit cutoff for the quality draw increases. On top of that, the firm size distribution
(i.e., sales or output or employment) and the distribution of the number of layers move
to the right in the FOSD sense.
54See Meagher (2003) for more details.
55Throughout the this section, I assume that f > ge.
56The Pareto assumption is needed only for the proof of the change in distributions. The result on the
change of the exit cutoff is independent of this distributional assumption.
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Proof: First, the key observation is that the ratio of operating profit of a firm with a
higher quality draw to operating profit of a firm with a lower quality draw increases when
the quality of MT improves. More specifically, for θ2 > θ1 I have
pi(θ2, A)
pi(θ1, A)
=
(1− β)Aσθ2
(
β
ge
)σ−1
+ ge
(1− β)Aσθ1
(
β
ge
)σ−1
+ ge
decreases in g. As g = bψ decreases when the quality of MT improves, this ratio must
increase when the quality of MT increases. Therefore, the exit cutoff must increase when
b decreases.
Next, I discuss what happens to firms at the exit cutoff. I make the the following
simplifying notations before the discussion. Let θ¯1 and θ¯2(> θ¯1) be the exit cutoffs
before and after MT improves respectively. Let A1 and A2 be the corresponding adjusted
market size. Let b1 and b2(< b1) be the inefficiency of MT before and after MT improves
respectively. I prove that firms on the exit cutoff increase their revenue, employment,
output and the number of layers after MT improves. First, the revenue must increase for
firms at the exit cutoff as
S(θ¯1, A1) = σ(f − g1e) < σ(f − g2e) = S(θ¯2, A2).
Second, output that equals x∗T also increases for firms at the exit cutoff. This is because
A1 > A2.
Third, as
T = log(xT )
and employment equals xT − 1, both the number of layers and employment increase for
firms at the exit cutoff.
Third, I prove the result that the firm size distribution and the distribution of the
number of layers move to the right in the FOSD sense when MT improves. Similar to
the proof in the paper, the key thing to show is that for any c > 1
S(cθ¯2, A2) > S(cθ¯1, A1),
xT (cθ¯2, A2) > xT (cθ¯1, A1),
l(cθ¯2, A2) > l(cθ¯1, A1)
and
T (cθ¯2, A2) > T (cθ¯1, A1).
First, note that
S(cθ¯, A)
S(θ¯, A)
= c
and
xT (cθ¯, A)
xT (θ¯, A)
= c,
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which do not depend on A and θ¯. As it has already been shown that S(θ¯2, A2) > S(θ¯1, A1)
and xT (θ¯2, A2) > xT (θ¯1, A1), I conclude that
S(cθ¯2, A2) > S(cθ¯1, A1)
and
xT (cθ¯2, A2) > xT (cθ¯1, A1),
which mean that the distributions of revenue and output move to the right in the FOSD
sense when MT improves. Second, as l(θ, A) = xT (θ, A)− 1 and T (θ, A) = log(xT (θ, A))
for any (θ, A), I also have
l(cθ¯2, A2) > l(cθ¯1, A1)
and
T (cθ¯2, A2) > T (cθ¯1, A1)
which mean that the distributions of employment and the number of layers move to the
right in the FOSD sense as well when MT improves. QED.
The intuitions behind this proposition are the same as the intuitions in the paper.
The management shock common across all firms benefits firms with more layers dispro-
portionately more. As a result, the least efficient firms exit the market and the most
efficient firms thrive. Therefore, the firm size distribution and the distribution of the
number of layers move to the right in the FOSD sense after the management shock.
Fourth, I discuss the welfare implication of an improvement in MT. In order to derive
results on welfare, I solve for the exit cutoff and the adjusted market size first. Based on
the discussion in the previous section, I derive the ZCP condition and the FE condition
using equation (84). More specifically, the ZCP condition states that
(1− β)Aσθ¯
( β
ge
)σ−1
= f − ge. (86)
The FE condition says that ∫ ∞
θ=θ¯
(pi(θ, A)− f)g(θ)dθ = fe,
which can be further reduced to
(f − ge)(θmin/θ¯)
k
(k − 1) = fe.
Therefore, the exit cutoff can be solved as
θ¯ = θmin
( (f − ge)
fe(k − 1)
) 1
k
. (87)
Substituting equation (32) into equation (29) leads to the solution of the adjusted market
size A as
Aσ =
(f − ge)(ge)σ−1
(1− β)βσ−1θ¯ =
(f − ge)1− 1k (ge)σ−1((k − 1)fe) 1k
(1− β)βσ−1θmin . (88)
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Now, I derive an explicit expression of welfare in the closed economy. Since welfare
equals ph (i.e., wage offered in the homogeneous sector), I calculate the welfare using the
following equation:[
WCper(A, θ¯)− ψLDper(A, θ¯)
]
P1(θ¯, A)
σ−1 +
(1− γ)Aσ
γ
= p
1− (1−γ)(σ−1)
γ
h L. (89)
Based on equations (82), (83), (87) and (88), I obtain that57
P1(θ¯, A)
σ−1 =
(ge
β
)σ−1 (k − 1)
kθ¯
, (90)
LDper(A, θ¯) =
k
k − 1xT (θ¯)− 1, (91)
and
WCper(A, θ¯) = LDper(A, θ¯)ge = ge
[ k
k − 1xT (θ¯)− 1
]
, (92)
where xT (θ¯) =
(σ−1)(f−ge)
ge
is the output level of the smallest firms in equilibrium in terms
of the final composite good. Note that both LDper(A, θ¯) and WCper(A, θ¯) must be
greater than or equal to zero. Thus, it must be true that
xT (θ¯) ≥ k − 1
k
,
which implies that58
f >
σ − 1
k
σ − 1 bψe. (93)
After having substituting equations (90) to (92) into the L.H.S. of equation (89), I end
up with
ψ(be− 1)
[k(σ − 1)(f − ge)
(k − 1)ge − 1
](ge
β
)σ−1 (k − 1)
kθmin
(fe(k − 1)
(f − ge)
) 1
k
+
(1− γ)
γ
(f − ge)1− 1k (ge)σ−1((k − 1)fe) 1k
(1− β)βσ−1θmin .
Denote that
B(b) ≡ (ge)
σ−1(ge− ψ)
(f − ge) 1k
[(σ − 1)(f − ge)
ge
− k − 1
k
]
+
(1− γ)σ
γ
(f − ge)1− 1k (ge)σ−1. (94)
Therefore, welfare in the closed economy is
pch =
[(fe(k − 1)) 1kB(b)
βσ−1θminL
] γ
γ−(1−γ)(σ−1)
, (95)
57Note that price charged by a firm with a efficiency level θ is Aθq/σxT (θ)
−1/σ = geβ . This means that
all firms charge the same price, as the quality of their goods differs.
58This condition must be true, since the entrepreneur can always produce one unit of good by herself.
This implies that output level of any active firm must be greater than or equal to one, if all firms use
management hierarchies to produce in equilibrium. As in the main context of the paper, I focus on the
case in which there are no self-employed entrepreneurs.
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and there are welfare gains from an improvement in MT if and only if one of the following
conditions holds.
d lnB(b)
db
> 0,
σ − 1
σ
> γ
or
d lnB(b)
db
< 0,
σ − 1
σ
< γ.
The above condition is not intuitive, since it involves many parameters. Now, I derive
a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of welfare gains from better MT.
From equation (94), I conclude that B
′
(b) > 0 if both
(f − bψe)1− 1k (bψe)σ−1
and
(bψe)σ−2(f − bψe)1− 1k (bψe− ψ)
increase in t. Calculation shows that the first expression increases with b, since
σ − 1
bψe
>
1− 1
k
f − bψe
implied by condition (93). Moreover, the second expression also increases with b, since
σ − 2
bψe
+
1
bψe− ψ >
σ − 1
bψe
>
1− 1
k
f − bψe.
Therefore, B(b) increases with b. As a result, welfare increases after an improvement in
MT if and only if
σ − 1
σ
> γ.
Finally, I discuss the condition under which the type of equilibrium I investigate exists.
Namely, when does every labor submarket have unemployment? Every employed worker
receives beψ as wage compensation in the CES sector and every worker receive ph as wage
compensation in the homogeneous sector. Therefore, a necessary and sufficient condition
for the equilibrium to exist is that
pch ≤ ψ(be− 1).
Note that the above condition contains only exogenous parameters, as pch only contains
exogenous parameters. Furthermore, this condition puts an upper bound on L when
σ−1
σ
> γ and a lower bound on L when σ−1
σ
< γ.
9.5 A Continuous Number of Layers: the Open Economy
9.5.1 Equilibrium Outcomes
I calculate the WGT using following several steps. First, optimal allocation of output
between two symmetric markets implies that
qd(θ) =
qτσ−1
1 + τσ−1
(96)
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and
px(θ) = τpd(θ) =
τge
β
, (97)
where px(θ) and pd(θ) are prices charged in the foreign market and in the domestic market
respectively, if the firm exports.
Second, I solve for the product market equilibrium. First, the indifference condition
between exporting or not is
τσ−1fx =
Aσ
σ
θ¯x
( β
ge
)σ−1
. (98)
Second, the FE condition in the open economy becomes∫ θ¯x
θ=θ¯
(f − ge)θ
θ¯
g(θ)dθ +
∫ ∞
θ=θ¯x
(f − ge) θ¯x
θ¯
(
1 +
1
τσ−1
) θ
θ¯x
g(θ)dθ
−(f − ge)
(θmin
θ¯
)k
− fx
(θmin
θ¯x
)k
= fe, (99)
Using equations (98) to (99) and the ZCP condition in equation (37), I solve for the exit
cutoff which equals
θ¯ = θmin
( (f − ge)
fe(k − 1)
) 1
k
[
1 +
(fxτσ−1
f − ge
)−k+1 1
τσ−1
] 1
k
. (100)
And, the exporting cutoff is
θ¯x = θ¯
fxτ
σ−1
(f − ge) . (101)
Substituting equation (101) into equation (98) yields the solution for the adjusted market
size which is equal to
Aσ =
(f − ge)(ge)σ−1
(1− β)βσ−1θ¯ =
(f − ge)1− 1k (ge)σ−1((k − 1)fe) 1k
(1− β)βσ−1θmin
[
1 +
(fxτσ−1
f − ge
)−k+1 1
τσ−1
]− 1
k
.
(102)
Third, I solve for the welfare (i.e., the workers’ expected payoff). Using the labor-
market-clearing conditions in equations (39) and (40), I restate the labor-market-clearing
condition as
ψ(be− 1)
[
k
k − 1
(σ − 1)(f − ge)
ge
[
1 + τ 1−σ
( fxτσ−1
(f − ge)
)−k+1]
− 1
](ge
β
)σ−1
(k − 1)
kθmin
(fe(k − 1)
(f − ge)
) 1
k
[
1 +
(fxτσ−1
f − ge
)−k+1 1
τσ−1
]− 1
k [
1 + τ 1−σ
( fxτσ−1
(f − ge)
)−k+1]−1
+
(1− γ)
γ
(f − ge)1− 1k (ge)σ−1((k − 1)fe) 1k
(1− β)βσ−1θmin
[
1 +
(fxτσ−1
f − ge
)−k+1 1
τσ−1
]− 1
k
= p
1− (1−γ)(σ−1)
γ
h L, (103)
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where the first part of the left hand side (LHS) of the above equation is related to the
number of job applicants in the CES sector, while the second part of the LHS of the
above equation is related to the number of workers in the homogeneous sector. In total,
it states that the number of workers who seek jobs is equal to the fixed labor endowment,
L. Solving equation (103), I obtain the welfare in the open economy as
poh =
[(fe(k − 1)) 1kA(b, τ)
βσ−1θminL
] γ
γ−(1−γ)(σ−1)
, (104)
where
A(b, τ) ≡ ψ(be− 1)
[
k
k−1
(σ−1)(f−ge)
ge
[
1 + τ 1−σ
(
fxτσ−1
(f−ge)
)−k+1]
− 1
]
(ge)σ−1
(k−1)
k
(
1
(f−ge)
) 1
k
[
1 +
(
fxτσ−1
f−ge
)−k+1
1
τσ−1
]− 1
k [
1 + τ 1−σ
(
fxτσ−1
(f−ge)
)−k+1]−1
+ (1−γ)σ
γ
(f − ge)1− 1k (ge)σ−1
[
1 +
(
fxτσ−1
f−ge
)−k+1
1
τσ−1
]− 1
k
. (105)
Therefore, the change in welfare is
WGT (b, τ) ≡ p
o
h
pah
− 1 =
[A(b, τ)
B(b)
] γ
γ−(1−γ)(σ−1) − 1. (106)
Note that WGT are not guaranteed.59 However, I am going to derive some sufficient
conditions assuring WGT in next subsection.
Before proceeding to the discussion of WGT, I discuss the condition under which the
type of equilibrium I investigate exists. The equilibrium exists and is unique if
poh ≤ ψ(be− 1),
where poh is defined in equation (103). Note that the above condition only contains
exogenous parameters (i.e., primitives of the model). Furthermore, this condition puts
an upper bound on L when σ−1
σ
> γ and a lower bound on L when σ−1
σ
< γ.
9.5.2 Management Quality, the Trade Share, and the Welfare Gains from
Trade
In this subsection, I show how management quality affects the trade share and discuss
how it affects the WGT. I discuss the relationship between management quality and
the trade share first. Let λ be the share of domestic consumption in total expenditure
on the CES goods. Using equations (96)-(97) and (100)-(102), I derive the domestic
consumption share as
λ(τ, b) =
τσ−1
(
θ¯x
θ¯
)k−1
1 + τσ−1
(
θ¯x
θ¯
)k−1 (107)
59I use WGT (b, τ) to denote the welfare change from opening up to trade to save notations. For some
parameter values, WGT (b, τ) might be negative, which implies welfare losses from trade.
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and the import share as
1− λ(τ, b) = 1
1 + τσ−1
(
θ¯x
θ¯
)k−1 . (108)
Since θ¯x
θ¯
increases in b from equation (101), the better the MT, the bigger the share of
exporting firms. Furthermore, equation (108) shows that the better the MT, the bigger
the trade share.
Next, I derive sufficient and necessary conditions under which there are WGT. Before
moving on, I make the following simplifying notations.
t ≡ ge = bψe;
C(t, τ) ≡ f
−k+1
x τ
−k(σ−1)
(f − ge)−k+1 .
Note that C(t, τ, fx) decreases with t, τ and fx. Calculation shows that
dA(b, τ)
dτ
< 0,
if and only if
Q(σ, γ, fx, f, τ, ψ) =
(σ − 1)(f − t)
t
+
(1− γ)σ
γ
f − t
t− ψ −
k2 − 1
k(1 + C(t, τ))
> 0. (109)
Therefore, there are WGT (i.e., WGT (b, τ) > 0), if and only if one of the following two
conditions holds:
Q(σ, γ, fx, f, τ, ψ) > 0,
σ − 1
σ
> γ
or
Q(σ, γ, fx, f, τ, ψ) < 0,
σ − 1
σ
< γ.
I will discuss the economic interpretation of these conditions in what follows.
Since the above conditions are not intuitive, I derive sufficient conditions that guar-
antees WGT. I focus on the case in which σ−1
σ
> γ first. In this case, the inequality in
equation (109) holds for all possible values of k and τ if
f >
[
1 +
(σ − 1)k
σ2 − σ + 1
]
t =
[
1 +
(σ − 1)k
σ2 − σ + 1
]
ψeb. (110)
The above condition indicates that when the elasticity of substitution is big, there are
WGT if the management quality is high. Note that the condition in equation (110) is a
sufficient condition for the existence of WGT for all possible levels of the iceberg trade
cost. In other words, there might be welfare losses for certain reductions in the iceberg
trade cost, if the condition in equation (110) is not satisfied.
In the case in which σ−1
σ
≤ γ, a sufficient condition for the existence of the WGT is
ψeb
[
1 +
k2 − 1
2k
σ − 1
σ2 − σ + 1
]
>
k2 − 1
2k
σ − 1
σ2 − σ + 1ψ + f. (111)
77
The above condition says that when the elasticity of substitution is small, there are WGT
if the management quality of firms in the CES sector is low. The economic reasoning
follows the same logic that I have discussed above. In summary, WGT are not guaranteed
in a world with multiple frictions. In particular, whether or not there are WGT crucially
depends on whether or not resources that are reallocated after the trade liberalization
are used inefficiently before the trade liberalization.
Now, I show that under one of the above sufficient conditions (i.e., equation (110) and
σ−1
σ
> γ), the complementarity result holds. Namely, the better is the MT, the larger
are the WGT. I focus on this condition, since the parameters of the calibrated model
presented in the next section satisfy this condition. Recall that the WGT are
WGT (b, τ) ≡ p
o
h
pah
− 1 =
[ B(b)
A(b, τ)
] γ
(1−γ)(σ−1)−γ − 1.
Denote
D(b, τ) ≡ B(b)
A(b, τ)
.
As long as d lnD(b)
db
< 0, the complementarity result holds when σ−1
σ
> γ. Calculation
shows that
d lnD(b)
db
< 0,
since t2 + ψ(f − 2t) > 0, C(t, τ) > 0 and
f >
[
1 +
(σ − 1)k
σ2 − σ + 1
]
t.
Therefore, there are the WGT, and better MT makes the WGT larger if
f >
[
1 +
(σ − 1)k
σ2 − σ + 1
]
t,
σ − 1
σ
> γ.
9.5.3 A Comparison to the ACR Formula
I derive the formula for the WGT in this subsection. Among the two aggregate statistics
appearing in the ACR formula, one statistic (i.e., the domestic consumption share) is
derived in equation (107). The other one which is the elasticity of the trade share with
respect to the variable trade cost is calculated as
 =
∂ln (1− λ(τ, b))/λ(τ, b)
∂ln τ
= −(σ − 1)k.
Calculation shows that the WGT are
WGT (b, τ) = λ(τ, b)
γ
k(γ−(1−γ)(σ−1))
[[
1 + (1−γ)σ
γ(σ−1)
be
(be−1)
]
xT (θ¯)− k−1k λ(τ, b)[
1 + (1−γ)σ
γ(σ−1)
be
(be−1)
]
xT (θ¯)− k−1k
] γ
γ−(1−γ)(σ−1)
,
(112)
where
xT (θ¯) =
(σ − 1)(f − t)
t
(113)
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is the output level of the smallest firms in equilibrium. Note that this variable is unit-free,
since all variables in the model are denominated in terms of the final composite good.
Equation (113) is a function of ratios as well, since f/t is the ratio of the fixed production
cost to the equilibrium wage offered in the CES sector. Thus, the value of equation (113)
does not depend on the units that are used to measure the output in equilibrium.
I need information on the expenditure share on the CES goods (i.e., γ), the manage-
ment quality (i.e., 1
b
) and the output level of the smallest firms (i.e., xT (θ¯)) in order to
evaluate the welfare change due to opening up to trade. In an extreme case in which
there is no outside sector, the above equation is simplified to
WGT (b, τ) = λ(τ, b)
1
k
xT (θ¯)− k−1k λ(τ, b)
xT (θ¯)− k−1k
.
Even in this extreme case, information on three variables is still needed to evaluate the
welfare change from opening up to trade. A new variable that does not show up in
the ACR formula is the output level of the smallest firms in equilibrium. In summary,
in a world with information frictions which validate the use of management hierarchies,
evaluating the WGT requires more information than that contained in the ACR formula.
9.6 Another Type of Equilibrium
The paper considers one type of equilibrium in which there is unemployment in every labor
submarket. This type of equilibrium must uniquely exist under restrictions on parameter
values. However, when the outside option of workers is high enough in equilibrium, firms
in the CES sector that pay the lowest wages are forced to raise their wages up to the
level of the sum of the workers’ outside option and the cost to exert effort. As a result,
job applicants who enter the labor submarkets of these firms are fully employed. In other
words, these labor submarkets are perfectly competitive markets. Therefore, this type
of equilibrium contains both labor submarkets that have no unemployment and labor
submarkets that have unemployment. This is the third type of equilibrium which I have
not considered in the paper.60
I change the setup of the model slightly in order to simplify the analysis. Different
from the paper, I assume that there is only one sector (i.e., the CES sector) in the
economy (i.e., γ = 1), and there are infinitely many workers who have a fixed outside
option ph (the net payoff they receive from working elsewhere) and can choose whether
or not to enter the CES sector. Admittedly, I can not discuss welfare implications under
this alternative specification of the model, since the welfare of workers is fixed by an
exogenous parameter (i.e., ph). However, I show that qualitative results of the model
except for the results on welfare hold in this type of equilibrium as well using a numerical
example.
There are four equilibrium conditions in total under the above alternative specifica-
tions. First, the two equilibrium conditions for the product market (i.e., the CES sector)
60The first type of equilibrium is an equilibrium in which every labor submarket is a competitive market
that has a uniform wage and no unemployment. This equilibrium exists when the cost of exerting effort
were zero (i.e., no incentive problems). The second type of equilibrium is an equilibrium in which every
labor submarket has unemployment. This type of equilibrium exists when the cost of exerting effort is
high enough.
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are still the ZCP condition and the FE condition (i.e., equations (23) and (24)). Second,
the outside option of workers (i.e., ph) pins down the number of job applicants in each
labor submarket (e.g., equation (26)) and the total number of job applicants in the CES
sector (e.g., equation (28)). Finally, the aggregate income E is still determined by the
market-clearing condition of the final composite good that is equation (30). Note that as
the pool of potential entrepreneurs is large enough, the FE condition holds with equality.
The indifference condition of workers holds with equality as well, since there are infinitely
many workers who are willing to enter the CES sector, as long as the expected payoff
obtained from entering the CES sector is bigger than or equal to ph. In total, I end
up with four equations (i.e., equations (23), (24), (28) and (30)) and four endogenous
variables: the exit cutoff θ¯, the mass of firms M , the aggregate labor demand of the CES
sector Lc and the aggregate income E. I eliminate one condition (i.e., equation (30)) and
normalize the ideal price index of the CES goods to one.
I show that qualitative results derived in the paper hold in the current case as well.
As it is hard to prove results analytically, I simulate the model to show the existence of
the pro-competitive effect of improvements in MT. The approach to solve the model in
the current case is similar to the simulation algorithm I have used in the paper. More
specifically, first I assume that the outside option of workers (i.e., ph) does no bind when
firms choose their optimal wage schedules (i.e., assume that wi(θ)−ψ ≥ ph ∀ (i, θ)), and
then solve for the value of (θ¯, A). Next, I check whether or not wi(θ)− ψ ≥ ph for all (i,
θ), and I consider the case in which wi(θ) − ψ < ph for some (i, θ).61 In the simulation
example, I find that among firms that have two layers (i.e., T = 1), the smallest ones
would have offered wages lower than ph+ψ, if they ignored the outside option of workers.
Thus, the optimization problem of these firms has to be resolved, and the outside option
of workers has to be taken into account when the firm designs the optimal wage schedule.
I solve the optimization problem of firms that are constrained to offer wage schedules
in two steps. First, I derive the cutoff for θ below which firms have to raise their wages
up to ph + ψ. As only firms that have two layers may be constrained to offer the wage
schedules in the simulated example, I only consider firms that have two layers now.
Without being constrained by the outside option of workers, a firm that has two layers
would offer wage wi(θ) at
wi(θ) = bψ
(Aβθ 1σ
2bψ
) σ
σ+1
.
Therefore, the cutoff θ1 is
θ1 =
( 2
Aβ
)σ (ph + ψ)σ+1
bψ
. (114)
Next, I discuss the optimization problem for a firm that has the demand draw below
θ1. Its objective function can be stated as
maxw,N Aθ
1
σNβ − wN
s.t. w ≥ ph + ψ,
w
bN
≥ ψ,
61As workers’ wage at layer i does not change monotonically with firm size, it is not necessarily true
that wi(θ)− ψ < ph for the smallest firms.
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Figure 11: The Modified AVC Curve and MC curve
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where the first constraint is the lower bound on wage that the firm can offer, and the
second constraint is the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint for the production workers
to exert effort.62 There are two types of solutions to the above optimization problem
depending on the value of θ¯. First, if θ¯ ≥ θ1
2σ
, the solution is
w∗ = ph + ψ, N∗ =
ph + ψ
bψ
(115)
for θ ∈ [θ¯, θ1]. Second, if θ¯ < θ12σ , the solution for firms with θ ∈ [ θ12σ , θ1] is still characterized
by equation (115). The solution for firms with θ ∈ [θ¯, θ1
2σ
] is characterized by
w∗ = ph + ψ, N∗(θ) =
(
Aβθ
1
σ
ph + ψ
)σ
. (116)
The average variable cost (AVC) and the marginal cost (MC) are slightly different in
the current case compared with the case discussed in paper. First, the AVC curve given
T = 1 becomes a horizontal line at w0 ≡ ph + ψ for output less than N0 ≡ ph+ψbψ . Firms
cannot reduce wages paid to production workers below ph + ψ, even if output and the
span of control fall below ph+ψ
bψ
. Second, the MC curve also becomes a horizontal line at
w0 = ph + ψ for output less than N0, as firms pay ph + ψ to every production worker for
any output level smaller than ph+ψ
bψ
. This implies that there is a discontinuous increase
in the MC when output exceeds N0. When output exceeds N0, a firm has to increase
wage payment to all existing workers in order to produce more, while wage paid to every
worker is a constant (i.e., w0) for any output level less than N0. Figure 11 shows the
AVC and MC curves of the firm in the current case.
Due to these changes in the cost functions, there are three cases to consider when
the firm produces output using a management hierarchy with two layers. First, if the
demand draw is bigger than θ1, which implies that the optimal output exceeds N0, output
62Note that the span of control is 1N for the entrepreneur.
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and wage are the same as the ones I have derived in the paper (i.e., equation (14) in the
paper and the equation for wi(θ) on page 48 of the paper). This case is illustrated by the
marginal revenue (MR) curve for θ = 4.5 in Figure 11. Second, if the demand draw of
a firm is between θ1
2σ
and θ1, the firm produces output at N0, as there is a discontinuous
increase in the MC at N0. This case is represented by the MR curve for θ = 1 in Figure
11. Finally, if the demand draw of a firm is smaller than θ1
2σ
, the firm faces a constant MC.
The optimal wage and output are solved in equation (116). Note that whether or not the
third case appears in equilibrium depends on whether or not θ¯ is smaller than θ1
2σ
. In the
numerical example I am going to show, only the first two cases appear in equilibrium.
Simulation results show that qualitative results of the paper still hold in the current
case. First, the exit cutoff for demand draw θ increases when MT improves, which is
shown in Table 10. Second, Figure 12 shows that the firm size distribution moves to the
right in the FOSD sense when the quality of MT improves. Third, when MT improves,
aggregate productivity of active firms increases due to both the within-firm effect and
the between-firm effect. Finally, all surviving firms increase the number of layers weakly
when the quality of MT improves. The last two results are shown in Figure 13.
Table 10: The Cutoffs
θ¯ (the exit cutoff) θ1
b=1.45 4.4498 4.5998
b=1.38 4.6991 5.4608
ψ = 0.44, ph = 0.56, σ = 3.8, k = 1.1, θmin = 1
The are two effects that make the exit cutoff increase when MT improves. First, an
improvement in MT benefits firms having more layers disproportionately more when they
are not constrained to offer the wage schedules (i.e., firms having demand draw θ(> θ1)).
This effect is due to the cost structure of the firm that have been discussed in the paper.
Second, firms with the lowest demand draws among firms that have two layers (i.e., firms
with demand draw θ ∈ [4.6991, 5.4608] in the simulation) can not fully realize the benefit
of improved MT. They offer the lowest wages to production workers before MT improves.
When MT improves, they are forced to set the wage at ph + ψ which is higher than
what they would choose without the constraint of the workers’ outside option (i.e., ph).
The second effect reinforces the first one, as it also favors firms that have better demand
draws. In total, these two effects together make the exit cutoff increase and intensify
market competition.
Changes in firm-level and aggregate-level outcomes are results of the intensified com-
petition triggered by an improvement in MT. First, surviving firms become bigger on
average when MT improves, since the smallest firms exit the market and the biggest firm
expand. Second, aggregate productivity increases, as the least productive firms exit the
market and the productivity of surviving firms increases. Finally, surviving firms weakly
increase the number of layer, as better MT reduces their labor costs and incentives firms
to produce more. In sum, the qualitative results of an improvement in MT discussed in
the paper hold in the current case as well.
The takeaway from this subsection is that the key economic force of an improvement
in MT discussed in the paper (i.e., firms with better demand draws benefit dispropor-
tionately more from such an improvement) also exists in the case in which some labor
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Figure 12: The Firm Size Distribution
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Figure 13: Aggregate Productivity and the Number of Layers
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submarkets don’t have unemployment. Moreover, there is another channel through which
this uneven effect works as what I have discussed above.
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